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 After Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War in 1945, the country became not only 
ground zero for the first use of atomic weapons, but also experienced year zero of the 
postwar, democratic era—the top-down reorganization of the country politically and 
socially—ushered in by the American Occupation. While the method of government 
changed, the state rallied around two pillars: the familiar fixture of big business and 
economics, and the notion of “peace” supplied by the new constitution. At this forma-
tive time, two uniquely postwar groups of people came to be excluded: the hibakusha, 
the atomic bombing survivors who epitomize ground zero, and the people of Minamata 
affected by industrial mercury pollution who symbolize the price of unbridled economic 
expansion which Japan embarked upon in year zero. 
 As victims of technologically-based poisoning, both the hibakusha and the vic-
tims in Minamata became excluded in their own communities, due to the secrecy and 
reticence at a governmental level surrounding their poisoning, but also because of Shintō 
notions of purity, which further marked hibakusha and Minamata victims as “diseased.” 
The stigmatization and rejection both of these groups suffered came at the same moment 
their nation pursued a democratic, representative path to recovery and prosperity for the 
citizens of Japan. These post-war “poisoned people” are symbols of the cost of technol-
ogy to humanity and are important not only to Japan’s history, but to that of the world. 
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1INTRODUCTION
Ground Zero, Year Zero, and a New Japan
On August 6 and 9, 1945, Japan became ground zero on the receiving end of the 
first uses of atomic weaponry. On August 15, 1945, Japan also entered year zero1 of the 
postwar, democratic era when the American Occupation led the overhaul of the country 
from the top down into a new democracy designed to eliminate even the “will to war.”2 
This “restart” of the country in year zero meant that, as illustrated in a political cartoon 
by Etsurō Katō,3 even the once hard-line militarists were “donning the morning coat of 
democracy”4 as the government was reluctantly re-routed from a totalitarian, militaristic 
state into a disarmed and democratic one. At this same time, Japanese society at large 
began redefining what exactly being “Japanese” meant along the new democratic line, 
even as they “endured the unendurable,” as Emperor Hirohito had urged in his surrender 
speech.5 
In order for the Japanese to endure, they had to change and adapt to a new reality, 
 
1 Gluck applied the term to Japan from the post-World War II German context in 
which it was first coined in 1945. Gluck, Carol. “The Past in the Present.” Postwar Japan 
as History. Ed. Gordon, Andrew. University of California Press, 1993. 64-66. 
 
2
 Dower, John. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1999. 77.
 
3 Names appearing in this thesis are presented in the western style with the given 
name occurring first and the surname last.
 
4
 Dower, John. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1999.  67.
 
5
 Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: Harp-
er Collins, 2000. 529. “Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War,” called the 
Gyokuonhōsō, or Emperor’s Voice Broadcast.
2their new democracy, and a new national self-image. To accomplish this, the nation 
rallied once more around the figure of the Emperor, whose office had remained intact but 
was secularized following the surrender and American Occupation, though veneration 
of the Emperor had been a prominent feature of the state in both the wartime and prewar 
periods. In another carry-over from the prewar period, Japanese bureaucracy renewed its 
focus on the economy as a cultural pillar, identifying it as the vehicle by which prosperity 
could be achieved for the newly democratic nation in the wake of the devastation of the 
Pacific War. This particular selection of a national tenet was given an aura of newness and 
acceptability by linking it to the model of capitalist America, even though “big business,” 
in the form of governmentally sanctioned monopolies, or zaibatsu, had been the modus 
operandi of imperialistic, expansionist Japan. With the advent of the new democratic 
constitution of Japan and its famous Article Nine, known as the “Peace Clause” which 
denied war as a right of the state,6 peace was also “selected” as a pillar of the new Japan 
and its new self image. 
Even as the coalescing new Japanese self-image incorporated democracy, 
peace, and economy to create its new “body politic,” two groups of victims, linked by 
the commonality of having been poisoned by modern technology and subsequently 
stigmatized for that poisoning, were uniquely excluded. Both the hibakusha, or survivors 
of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and those affected by industrial 
mercury pollution in the fishing town of Minamata became literally “poisoned peoples,” 
victims because of circumstances outside their control—circumstances created by 
radiation weapons and mercury catalysts—and then by their subsequent social and 
political exclusion due first to fear of contagion from their unknown diseases and then 
from their symbolic and, in many cases, active opposition to the technologies that 
victimized them. The stigmatization both groups faced occurred not only at a national 
 
6
  Constitution of Japan. 1947. 12 May 2010 <http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/
Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>.
3level, but also within their own immediate communities as each group came to be viewed 
both as physically impure, contaminated, and diseased, and as opposed to two of the 
fixtures of the new Japan: peace and economics—ground zero and year zero. 
Eiji Oguma first used the term “self-image” during his examination of the 
redefinition of Japan in his book, A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-Images. Oguma showed 
that the process of recreating the self-image was not a new one for Japan in 1945. The 
country had undergone a previous major transformation of its self-image in 1868 with 
the revolutionary Meiji Restoration that changed Japan from a feudal and agrarian set of 
Daimyō controlled domains to a modern and industrial nation with a central government. 
The Meiji shift had also opened Japan’s door to the world, even sanctioning approaching 
Japanese Imperialism. The formation of the Meiji era Japanese self-image was also a 
consciously selective process, guided by the Meiji oligarchs who chose state tenets such 
as the centrality of the Emperor, the need for modernization throughout all aspects of 
Japan from industry to culture, technology, militarism, and even colonialism.7
While the postwar realignment of the self-image also featured the centrality of 
the Emperor, modernization, the adoption of new technologies, and an emphasis on 
supporting big business and economic expansion, there are some distinct differences 
from the Meiji shift. One of the most important examples, noted extensively by Oguma, 
was the creation of the notion of a “homogeneous” society. 8 An effect of the revocation 
of Japan’s empire abroad due to unconditional surrender to the Allies in 1945, the loss 
of Japan’s colonial acquisitions severed all need for the new definition of Japan to be an 
“inclusive” one. Just as the Meiji had opened Japan to the world, the end of the War in 
the Pacific closed the country once again. The colonial imperative in terms of need for 
 
7 




 Oguma, Eiji. A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-images. 1995. Trans. Askew, Da-
vid. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002. xxvi-xxxvi, 24-30, 41-58, 95-109, 115-124, 
156-171, 189-202, 204-208, 220-284, 308-312, 316-349.
4control and the promotion of a sense of unity between conquered peoples in the gaichi, 
or the outer lands, and naichi, the Japanese home islands, resulted in an inclusively 
defined “Japaneseness” during the period of Japanese imperialism. This inclusiveness 
was evidenced by the use of the “hundred million” figure in slogans, such as “a hundred 
million hearts beat as one,”9 to refer to the number of subjects in the empire, a number 
only reached by including not only the seventy million ethnic Japanese, but also thirty 
million non-Japanese colonial subjects in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria,10 as well as 
Japan’s domestic minorities, the Ainu, Burakumin, and Okinawans. 
As a result, while the most important self-image of Japan during the imperial 
era was of a “mixed racial society” that by its very nature contained a “multitude of 
ethnicities,”11 the fundamental “Japaneseness” in the postwar was defined exclusively, 
creating distinct categories of others and outsiders. This pertained most directly to non-
Japanese ethnic groups, such as the formerly colonized Koreans, Manchurians, and 
Taiwanese still resident in the naichi, but also to previously “subsumed” minorities12 who 
were set ironically adrift from the main body in the postwar Japanese democracy. Even 
more ironic was that the two most stigmatized groups in postwar Japan—the poisoned 
hibakusha and the Minamata victims— were not “others,” separated by ethnicity or 
historical distinctions, but rather by virtue of their contamination and the ailments of their 
diseases.
 9 
 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999. 22, 59. Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire: 
Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. University of California Press, 1998. 
 199, 203.
 10
 Oguma, Eiji. A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-images. 1995. Trans. Askew, Da-
vid. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002. 23-26.
 11
 Oguma, Eiji. A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-images. 1995. Trans. Askew, Da-
vid. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002. 24, 41-46, 53-58, 116-124
 12
 These subsumed groups were formerly incorporated during the Imperial years 
to the Japanese main-body via reforms and annexations such as the abolition of the class 
system in 1871 that erased the privileged samurai, and, as a corollary, was to help Bura-
kumin re-enter normal society, as well as the formal annexation of the Ryūyū (Okinawa) 
islands in 1872, but also included the Ainu, and Koreans and Chinese living in Japan.
5Literary scholar Anne Sherif added another layer to Oguma’s ideas about the 
formation of the new self-image of Japan in her book Japan’s Cold War. Sherif argued 
that the Cold War “bipolar world view” coupled with American influence13—especially 
due to the seven years of American Occupation and the following diplomatic ties between 
America and Japan during the Cold War period—created even more criteria in the new 
Japanese self-image as a “democratically aligned”14 nation within the developing Cold 
War schema. Chief among these new concerns were political distinctions such as: “non-
Marxist,” “non-Communist,” “Pro-American,” “Capitalist,” “Anti-Russian,” and the 
converses to those positions and ideologies, as well as a complex set of implications 
that adopting one over the other would have on the global arena of the Cold War. 
Japanese participation in this system therefore also required that Japan accept the Cold 
War “peace,” which condoned international nuclear arsenals as the means of mutual 
deterrence for the use of those weapons. 
Sherif also pointed out that if democratic “morning coats” were donned in Japan, 
even though they initially had “Made in America” on the labels, they eventually came 
to mean something to the Japanese people themselves. The reaction to Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi’s unilateral, rather undemocratic ratification of the Anzenhoshō, or 
Anpo treaty,15 in 1960 and the bevy of social movements that sprang up to protest the act, 
demonstrated a measure of Japanese willingness to participate in the political process 
and stand up for the hallmarks of their new democracy. Though widespread in Tokyo, 
these democratic social movements were quickly characterized by the government as 




 Sherif, Ann. Japan’s Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law. New York: Co-
lombia University Press, 2009. 5-6, 202-209.
 
14
 Sherif, Ann. Japan’s Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2009. 203-209.
 
15
 United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.
6But the idea of “Made in America” also came to provide a driving inspiration to 
make a full “recovery” from the Pacific War, to become an economic powerhouse that 
could rival their former “benefactor,” the United States. Sherif discussed the ensuing 
links between, and indulgences for, big businesses that facilitated this “recovery” effort, 
and how the attitudes of materialism and the formation of the workplace society appeared 
in media of the day. It was because the government took business under its wings as the 
lifting force that would help elevate the standard of living and propel Japan to progress 
and success that any questions levied against the methods or consequences by which this 
was achieved were unfavorably received by political leaders.  Ironically, to compete in 
this manner, Japan’s period of “high-growth” adopted the production models used in the 
prewar and wartime years.16 
Japan’s constitutional Article Nine provided the first major pillar of the postwar 
self-image of Japan. Jane Yamazaki said that by breaking from its militarist past, the 
“[Japanese] body politic purges its guilt and can start afresh with a new sense of identity 
and self-worth,” and that this attitude is what led to the country defining itself as a “peace 
nation” as a means of apology for wartime aggression.17 Because the Cold War was 
comprised of ideological and psychological confrontations rather than typical battles 
involving tanks and troops, “peace” was created by detente instead of the true absence 
of active war.  The hibakusha opposition to nuclear technology, and especially nuclear 
weapons, became antithetical to the method by which this “peace” was maintained, 
via unspoken policies such as “M. A. D.”—Mutually Assured Destruction—predicated 
on escalating international nuclear arsenals all aimed at one another. As such, while 
hibakusha called for “No More Hiroshimas. No More Nagasakis,” the world seemed 
poised to repeat the fate of the two cities on a global scale, increasingly becoming 
 
16
 Horioka, Charles Yuji. “Consuming and Saving.” Postwar Japan as History. Ed. 
Gordon, Andrew. University of California Press, 1993. 262-292.
 17
 Yamazaki, Jane W. Japanese Apologies for World War II: A Rhetorical Study. 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 77.
7defined by which nations were sheltering under the “nuclear umbrellas” of the Cold War 
Superpowers.
Historian Carol Gluck observed that “progressive intellectuals” hailed the changes 
of year zero as the beginning of Japan’s true “modernity,”18 though the possibilities for 
real progress seemed increasingly remote as the temporal distance from the beginning of 
year zero increased and Japan’s government and industry increasingly returned to prewar 
and wartime policies and production models. The poisoned people of Minamata resulted 
from this unchecked economic development after year zero—a model given credence by 
American capitalist democracy—and became a group that was viewed as antithetical, 
or somehow opposed to the economic path that was bringing the new Japan back to a 
position of world prominence economically, even if it was tacitly sacrificing the few for 
the good of the many.    
It is the American influence in the immediate aftermath of the war that also 
helped relegate the experience of the atomic bombing to a near taboo subject, due 
primarily to American censorship and banning of bomb-related information during 
the first years of the Occupation.19 The ban only intensified uncertainty regarding the 
sicknesses of the hibakusha, and further facilitated their cultural stigmatization as an 
“impure” or “contaminated” people, especially in regards to the Shintō emphasis on 
purity of the body. Their atomic bomb related illnesses were termed genbakubyō, atomic 
bomb disease, and due to the sheer lack of facts and information, it was sometimes even 
thought to be contagious from person to person. Cordoned off due to their radiation 
sicknesses and left in a void for years due to the Occupation’s censorship, when their 
first official designation as a group of people came and was defined along medical lines 
according to the amount and type of symptoms from radiation poisoning, the position of 
 
18
 Gluck, Carol. “The Past in the Present.” Postwar Japan as History. Ed. Gordon, 
Andrew. University of California Press, 1993. 68.
 19 
 Sherif, Ann. Japan’s Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law. New York: Co-
lombia University Press, 2009. 154-156.
8the hibakusha as a “sickened” group of people was solidified. Coupling this to the fact 
they had witnessed an event and its accompanying horrors that others could not easily 
understand or relate to, the hibakusha became a clearly delineated group excluded from 
the mainstream of Japanese society. 
When the people of Minamata began to notice that they, their families, and 
community members were mysteriously falling sick and becoming crippled, they started 
an uphill battle, especially as the picture began to reveal the Chisso Corporation was 
responsible for widespread mercury poisoning that destroyed the victims’ nervous 
systems. Chisso had been a zaibatsu, a government sanctioned monopoly, in the 
chemical production business in the prewar years, and even after it was broken up by 
the American Occupation into three smaller companies, Chisso remained a substantial 
enough contributor to Japanese “progress” in the postwar period that the government 
stepped in to mitigate the cases that came to be leveled at Chisso for industrial poisoning 
and negligence, cases resolved in the company’s favor. Even the Minamata community 
itself was split between those who thought protesting and filing suits against Chisso 
was the appropriate course of action, and those who thought that to accuse and blame 
Chisso would ruin the local economy and destroy the community’s “prosperity.”20 
Because of these situations, those who were affected by the poisoning and those who 
came to champion their cause against Chisso and the government were also an excluded 
group from the mainstream of Japanese society, which seemed to perceive corporations 
like Chisso as unimpeachable and as important forces working towards the good of the 
country as a whole.  
Coalescing Oguma and Sherif’s points into a single account regarding the 
formation of the postwar self-image of Japan, the definition that moves to the forefront 
is perhaps the most common attribute assigned to Japanese society even today—
 20
 George, Timothy S. Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in 
Postwar Japan. Harvard University Press, 2001. 3, 73.
9“homogeneous.” Japan is often viewed as perceiving itself to be the possessor of a 
“strong sense of group and national identity and little or no ethnic or racial diversity,”21 or 
as “an extremely homogeneous society with non-Japanese, mostly Koreans and Chinese, 
making up only about 1% of the population.”22 In 1986, the Prime Minster of Japan 
at the time, Yasuhiro Nakasone, even stated that Japan was a “monoracial society.”23 
Demographically it seems true that Japan is a nation comprised almost entirely of 
one ethnic group—approximately ninety-six to ninety-nine percent24 of the people are 
ethnically Japanese. Homogeneity becomes a feature of the new Japanese self-image after 
year zero, and while not the source of the exclusion of groups, it points to a larger sense 
of group identification in Japan that in turn gives a tacit sanction to the radical exclusion 
of those perceived as not fitting into the homogenous category that represents the “new” 
Japan.
The tie between perceived homogeneity and peace and economy surfaces clearly 
in statements like Nakasone’s, asserting Japan’s successes in the last century, including 
its financial successes across the 1950’s to the 1980’s, the low levels of crime in even 
the densest urban areas, and the “miraculously” fast modernization and industrialization 
of the formerly “feudal” Japanese state in the Meiji period, can be credited to Japan’s 
 21
  Bestor, Theodore, and Hardacre, Helen. “Contemporary Japan: Culture and 
Society.” University of Colombia 2004. 12 May 2010 <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/t_ja-
pan_soc/>.
 22
 “Japanese Society.” Colombia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. 2007. 12 May 
2010 <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858982.html>. 
 23
 Yasuhiro Nakasone made that statement in September 1986 at a meet-
ing of the LDP. Bowen, Ezra. “Nakasone’s World Class Blunder.” Time Magazine 




 Bowen, Ezra. “Nakasone’s World Class Blunder.” Time Magazine On-
line 4 June 2001. 12 May 2010 <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arti-
cle/0,9171,1101861006-143333,00.html>. De Vos, George A., and Wetherall, William O. 
“Japan’s Minorities,” Report no. 3. London: Minority Rights Group, 1983. “Demograph-
ics of Japan – Minorities.” Global Oneness 1991. 12 May 2010 <http://www.experiencef-
estival.com/a/ Demographics_of_Japan_-_Minorities/id/1317270>. 
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perceived homogeneity and co-contingent promotion of shūdan ishiki, or trans personal 
identification and social harmony.25 In other words, that Japanese “homogeneity” was 
responsible for the success of the role of Japan as a “peace nation,” as well as Japanese 
economic success. This is a picture of Japan that omits a large, important part of 
the experience of the country in the later half of the twentieth century, including the 
experiences of the hibakusha and the victims of Minamata, and even reinforces the two 
groups social stigmatization and subsequent exclusion.
The inclusion of the radiation poisoned hibakusha and the mercury-poisoned 
people of Minamata, however, was not a priority for the “new” coalition of government 
and big business who were driving the vehicle of peace and prosperity in postwar 
Japan. Moving towards economic recovery and the rebuilding of the nation seemed 
to require that the needs of these two injured groups be ignored, or even buried. This 
attitude manifests most strongly (or perhaps most easily) in the form of resistance to act 
in the face of things that contradicted the adopted national self-image where achieving 
national goals was justified for the many at the expense of the few. The hibakusha and 
the Minamata victims were negative reminders of what Gluck referred to as having “gone 
wrong” in the prewar,26 and which were now at odds with the “democratic” Japan and its 
emphasis on peace and economy. Thus, the new Japan was looking towards the future, 
not back to the past, no matter how many “ghosts at the historical feast”27 remained 
ubiquitously present. 
The experiences of these excluded, poisoned people add dimensions to almost all 
aspects of modern Japan—socially, historically, and politically. They also directly pertain 
to the strength and level of actualization of Japanese democracy, demonstrating not 
 
25
 Davies, Roger J., and Ikeno, Osamu, eds. The Japanese Mind: Understanding 
Contemporary Japanese Culture. North Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing, 2002. 195-197.
 
26
 Gluck, Carol. “The Past in the Present.” Postwar Japan as History. Ed. Gordon, 
Andrew. University of California Press, 1993. 64.
 
27 
 Gluck, Carol. “The Past in the Present.” Postwar Japan as History. Ed. Gordon, 
Andrew. University of California Press, 1993. 66.
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only how minorities or “others” are treated, but also the ability of all voices to be heard. 
The hibakusha atomic bomb survivors and the Minamata victims of industrial mercury 
pollution further embody two critical Japanese experiences that have been ongoing since 
1945: dealing with the legacies of the Pacific War and the following nuclear arms race 
in the Cold War alongside rapid modernization and industrial progress. Hibakusha and 
Minamata victims also share a history of having been ignored and unacknowledged by 
the democratic government, and stigmatized in their own communities.
The hibakusha survivors and victims of Minamata are important, not only to 
Japan’s self-image, but to that of the world. The hibakusha specifically are the only 
people on earth who can speak first hand about the globally important issue of nuclear 
warfare. They are what makes Japan yuiitsu no hibakukoku, or the only country in the 
world to have been effected by atomic weapons. The people of any nation who have 
experienced industrial poisoning or pollution can relate to the Minamata victims and their 
struggle. In order to fully realize their own democracy and maintain a realistic view of 
their own self-image, Japan must integrate, compute, and come fully to terms with the 
experiences of the hibakusha and Minamata victims. Accepting these poisoned people 
into the body politic would give Japan a powerful and authentic voice in the world arena 
on issues that include peace, pollution, and how to care for all citizens by reconciling 
with painful legacies of the past, a voice which could not be discounted. 
The Aftermath of Victimization
Both the hibakusha and the poisoned people of Minamata are victims of incidents 
that were beyond their control. The term “victim” carries moral connotations of harm and 
wrongdoing, implying the existence of a group that has done the victimizing, as well as a 
group that has been wronged, and even often an exoneration of blame for those who have 
been victimized. In the context of Japan’s modern history, victimization is intimately 
12
connected to responsibility for the Pacific War and to the perception of coercion of the 
state upon its people to comply with and carry out that conflict, and by extension any 
“atrocities” committed during the war.  Japanese victimization also includes the atomic 
bombings, the position of Japan as a subordinate, occupied nation under America, and 
even to survivor’s guilt on the part of those who did not die for the State in combat, as 
well as the hibakusha who survived the bombings of their cities. The characterization of 
the Japanese nation as either an Imperial victimizer or as a victim at the hands of its own 
government during the war years is still a highly charged issue. 
Historian James Orr made an extensive study of the term “victim” and Japanese 
attitudes regarding it in his book, The Victim As Hero. He pointed to a shift in postwar 
period Japan from “victimizers” to a general shared sense of “victimhood,” the result of 
the American Occupation, the on-rushing Cold War culture, and the issue of the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki being a punishment out of proportion even for 
Japan’s actions as a nation during the Pacific War. Specifically, Orr presents the ultimate 
symbol of postwar Japanese victimhood as the Emperor, a “kind family man,” deceived 
and led by his own cabinet and the military.28 Exonerated by the American Occupation 
government, the Emperor’s status thus fell outside moral boundaries and he was freed 
from accusations of responsibility for the war and loss of life to the point it became 
taboo in Japan to discuss any potential responsibility for the war on the Emperor’s part, 
or make any other criticisms of the Imperial Household. In 1960, when author, Shichirō 
Fukazawa, wrote a short story titled, “Fūryū Mutan,” or “Dream of Courtly Elegance,”29 
in which the Crown Prince Akihito and his wife Michiko are executed, there was outrage 
from conservatives, an attempted lawsuit from the Imperial Household Agency, and even 
an incident of real homicide, when a young, right-wing activist broke into the home of 
the president of the company that published “Fūryū Mutan,” and, failing to find Hoji 
 
28
 Orr, James J. The Victim As Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in 
Postwar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001. 3-7, 32-35.
 29
 Fukazawa, Shichirō. “Fūryū Mutan.” Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1960.
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Shimanaka, stabbed Shimanaka’s housekeeper to death and wounded his wife.30 What 
followed was self-censorship on the part of many major magazines, and other media 
organizations, including the one that had originally published “Fūryū Mutan,” Chūō 
Kōron, which also issued an apology for having printed the story.31
Another key figure in elevating the sense of collective Japanese victimization 
to acceptance was Kaoru Yasui. Yasui was a principle figure in the early anti-atomic 
bomb movements of the 1950’s and 1960’s. He served as a leader in several atomic 
bomb movements, including as secretary for the Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgika, 
also known as Gensuikyō, or the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen 
Bombs. Orr argued that it was Yasui’s triumph to “bridge the gap” between the JCP, 
the Japan Communist Party, and JSP, the Japan Socialist Party, thereby creating a 
single “nonpartisan,” anti-nuclear movement that would become the Gensuikyō.32 
Instead of championing the excluded hibakusha, Yasui’s appeals made the argument 
that all Japanese were victims, thereby marginalizing the experience of the hibakusha 
themselves. The priority, as he saw it, for Gensuikyō was to address the atomic bombings 
and the pervasiveness of nuclear weapons as the enemy to world peace.
The terms “victim” and “victimhood” are connected indelibly to moral questions, 
often divorced from human elements, with a focus on the agent of the victimization rather 
those affected by it. Not only this, but to claim a universal victimization for Japan is to 
deny a very real, pressing disjunction between the actual groups of harmed people, such 
as hibakusha and Minamata victims, both of whom were bodily poisoned by technology 
which was compounded by cultural and religious notions in Japan related to bodily 
 
30 
 Bix, Herbert P. “Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan.” Japan Policy Re-
search Institute at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim Occasional 




 Treat, John W. “Beheaded Emperors and the Absent Figure in Contemporary 
Japanese Literature.” PMLA 109.1 (1994): 100-115.
 
32
 Orr, James J. The Victim As Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in 
Postwar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001. 8.
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purity found within both Shintō, the historic indigenous, as well as wartime and prewar 
state religion of Japan, and Japanese Buddhism. Two prominent notions of maintaining 
“purity” by practice in Shintō, laid down in a compendium by a monk in 1320, include 
not only “honesty” and “a calm mind,” but also “not to mourn for the dead ... not to have 
contact with disease.”33 Because of the close relationship, and indeed a kind of symbiosis, 
between Shintō and Buddhism in Japan, the importance of “purity” in a Buddhist sense 
also comes to be interpreted in a bodily manner, as well as a spiritual one. 
To facilitate a discussion of the hibakusha and those poisoned in Minamata, both 
of which implicitly include a moral subtext, differentiating between the terms “excluded” 
and “victim” is a necessity. Using the term “excluded” rather than “victim” focuses on 
individuals who are kept apart and separate by the vehicle of cultural stigmatization and 
ostracism, after the moment of their initial traumas. Exclusion highlights the irony of 
the situation of both the hibakusha and the mercury poisoned people of Minamata that 
their initial victimization—the flash and heat of the atomic bombs that were dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the accumulation of industrial mercury poisoning in 
their bodies that led to neuro-degeneration—should have stirred the compassion of 
their fellow citizens. Instead, the reaction to their victimization and the obfuscation 
of the factors and even facts of their “poisoning” led to their exclusion from those left 
“healthy.” Their exclusion entails a stigmatization on a very physical, bodily level, as 
truly “poisoned people.” While each group tried to express its experience of being both 
victim and excluded to the larger population of Japan through their writing, art, dialogue, 
and demonstration, they were also concerned with what that exclusion and continuing 
stigmatization meant for the state of Japanese democracy and the conduct of the 
government in regards to respecting democratic ideals and the rights of every citizen. 
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HIBAKUSHA
Exclusion After Ground Zero
 Hibakusha, victims of direct attack by atomic weapons, did not exist before 
August 6 and 9, 1945. Though they survived the first use of such weapons in history, they 
were immediately relegated to the fringe of Japanese society. The American Occupation, 
due to official censorship of the atomic bombings and all related information, solidified 
their exclusion even further. The reasons that SCAP, the Supreme Commander Allied 
Powers, gave for such censorship in an emerging new democracy included the guarding 
of “secret” information against Cold War “rivals,”34 and the preservation of America’s 
image as a bastion for human rights, democracy, and fair treatment in the face of the 
harsh realities of the bombings. The latter reason was especially important in regards to 
America’s position as the administrator of Japan during the Occupation. 
United States President Harry S. Truman had authorized the extension of a 
scientific group studying the effects of bombing in Germany, the U. S. Strategic Bombing 
Survey, to include a new Japanese branch in order to study the atomic bombings. This 
organization became the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, or ABCC. The ABCC 
studied many hibakusha, cataloging and examining their injuries and illnesses, during 
the seven years of the American Occupation. The intentional suppression of information 
regarding the bombings and all the related scientific observations and the studies 
conducted by ABCC scientists on both the ruined cities and their remaining inhabitants 
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remained secret. The ABCC personnel offered no treatment to those they examined.35 
The lack of information regarding the hibakusha health conditions deepened the general 
uncertainty among the Japanese public about this group of survivors. The hibakusha 
faced illnesses no one had experienced before, and the void of information lead to 
hearsay and speculation. There were rumors that atomic ailments could be contracted by 
contact with the hibakusha themselves, or by visiting the bombing sites. Such assertions 
were backed up by incidents of seemingly healthy hibakusha who suddenly took turns for 
the worse, and by tales of even non-hibakusha people who visited the ruins of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki and subsequently died.36 
The initial, “official” definition of an individual as a hibakusha was based on his 
or her proximity to the epicenter of the explosion. Once an individual was designated 
as a hibakusha his or her name was added to the list of official atomic bomb victims 
and he or she was given stipends and medical fee coverage. Despite this procedure of 
registration, no official law provided for hibakusha relief until 1957, twelve years after 
the atomic bombings, and five years after the end of the American Occupation. The 
catalyst for a hibakusha relief law was the irradiation of tuna fishermen aboard the vessel, 
Lucky Dragon no. 5, who were caught in the fallout from a hydrogen bomb test on Bikini 
Island in 1954. Despite the fact that the vessel was outside the danger zone declared 
by the United States government, all crewmen reported radiation-related illnesses from 
their time in the fallout and were hospitalized, and the boat’s radio operator died.37 With 
the tragedy of the Lucky Dragon no. 5, proximity to the epicenter itself was no longer 
sufficient to cover all hibakusha, and the definition of that category was expanded to 
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cover those who were caught in fallout and those who were affected by “black rain” well 
outside established epicenter zones. The law, titled the Atomic Bomb Victims Medical 
Care Law, redefined the classification of hibakusha to include medical criteria, such as 
the type and number of symptoms an individual hibakusha possessed, as well as radiation 
levels that the individual had experienced, instead of relying on location relative to an 
atomic blast. These new criteria became standards for defining new hibakusha. 
However, it was not just their ailments, SCAP policy, and general societal 
misinformation and disinterest that kept the hibakusha on the periphery of Japanese 
society. The very experiences of the hibakusha also separated them from the mainstream 
of Japan. Their situation was highly analogous to survivors of the Holocaust in Europe. 
Their trauma, the images and memories of having been suddenly thrust into a “living 
hell,”38 all left distinct impressions on even the youngest hibakusha. After surviving 
the blast many hibakusha were wracked with guilt because they remained alive when 
their family members and coworkers perished. Called “survivor’s guilt,” this condition 
included feelings of isolations and despair. 
Some hibakusha felt compelled to write or draw images related to their unique 
experience, and as a result there has been a steady outpouring of literature and art from 
the hibakusha community even during the Occupation and the accompanying intense 
censorship. Not only was this creativity an attempt to work through their trauma, it was 
also meant to increase the understanding and awareness of the atomic bombings, and to 
convey to non-hibakusha audiences the experience of being a survivor and excluded. 
The hibakusha discovered, as many other excluded groups have, that communicating 
the uniqueness of their experience further underlined their separateness from the general 
population. 
Others used that separation and the experience of the hibakusha atomic bomb 
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survival for political purposes. A collective sense of “atomic victimhood” became a tool 
in the political arena from almost the outset of the surrender, creating a rallying point 
for a core of non-partisan, national sentiment. Emperor Hirohito himself mentioned the 
atomic bombing in his surrender speech as a major reason for the decision to end the war 
and agree to the unconditional surrender demanded by the Allies: 
 Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb,   
 the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll    
 of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in   
 an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would   
 lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are   
 we to save the millions of our subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed   
 spirits of our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered    
 the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.39
Hirohito’s words, though they seemed to reference his own position and 
“atonement,” nonetheless made the atomic bombing into a universal threat against 
humanity, and gave the topic he addressed later in the speech, the “grand peace,” the 
underpinnings of a moral endeavor by Japan on behalf of the world. In the speech, the 
groundwork for what later developed into a perceived national asset—the Japanese status 
as yuiitsu no hibakukoku, or the only country to have been affected by the deliberate 
use of atomic weaponry—was laid, and the basis for interpreting the Japanese “grand 
peace” as fundamentally opposed to atomic weaponry and its horrors appeared for the 
first time. However, even in Hirohito’s speech, the actual hibakusha themselves are not 
mentioned, and neither are Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the two cities devastated by the 
bombings. While it may be argued that this omission was an attempt at solidarity with the 
victims—embracing their pain as a national pain—it can be argued that it minimized the 
horror of the personal situations of hibakusha. While the majority of Japanese may have 
felt injured by the atomic bombings, their generalized feelings of victimhood could never 
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approach the intensity of the agony that the hibakusha knew. 
Despite the “usefulness” of the hibakusha and the atomic experience politically, 
to keep the hibakusha and the atomic bombings prominent in the national eye was, to 
Japanese political conservatives, an unwelcome reminder of defeat and surrender in the 
Pacific War. For many politicians, it became a better philosophical option to reassign the 
atomic bombings to a “debt paid” for the Pacific War. This selective interpretation was 
unintentionally aided by SCAP’s atomic censorship policy. However, Japan has been 
forced at times to reconsider its attitude toward the atomic bombings and the excluded 
hibakusha, first with the Lucky Dragon no. 5 incident which occurred in 1954, and then 
when American nuclear submarines and other nuclear equipped vessels attracted the 
attention of the media. In fact, there was a swell of popular sentiment for the plight of 
hibakusha that culminated in a new law for hibakusha relief in 1966. 
Hibakusha are by no means a group without internal distinctions. There are 
hibakusha who are militant about their status and express it via protests and activism, 
seeking enhanced government recognition and reparations. There are also those who 
talk about their experiences in the atomic “hell,” and are openly known as a hibakusha, 
hoping to educate others and thereby achieve the mantra: “No More Hiroshimas. No 
More Nagasakis.” John Treat observed in his book on atomic bomb literature, Writing 
Ground Zero, that these outspoken hibakusha have an “irrepressible sense of themselves 
as ‘different.’”40 The source for this sense of difference can only be the atomic bombing 
and their experience of surviving it. There are Korean hibakusha that perhaps suffer even 
more heavily than other hibakusha, due to the added racial status and the complication 
of the 1965 normalization of relations between Japan and Korea that barred any Korean 
hibakusha outside of Japan from applying for any aid. There is even a portion of the 
hibakusha population that seeks to be free of their designation as such. They try to 
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be forgotten, instead of recognized, hiding their status, refusing to register as official 
hibakusha even to claim the monetary benefits. These hibakusha sometimes relocate and 
change their names to avoid what they perceive as the stigma of exclusion.
Some things were and are constants for all hibakusha, as evidenced in many 
hibakusha narratives. They were often unable to marry freely, unable to get certain jobs, 
and were sometimes shunned or locked away by their own families.41 These common 
realities of the hibakusha lives gradually entered the public’s consciousness and resulted 
in the 1966 Atomic Bomb Victims Special Measures Law, which both increased 
allowances for medical care and awarded reparations beyond those costs. These new 
stipends included expenses for funerals and loss of livelihood compensations. 
The attitudes of hibakusha themselves have also changed over the years. In the 
immediate wake of the atomic bombings, some hibakusha seemed interested in creating 
a record of their horrific experience as if to prove, in defiance of heavy censorship, that 
they existed and the bombings did occur. There is a definite element of “repetition” 
evidenced in the recordings of the hibakusha, a coping feature they share with other 
victims of mass traumas, including survivors of the Holocaust. Victims feel compelled 
to record and “repeat” their trauma in attempts to locate or document its foundation, 
recording their stories with as much factual detail as possible and thereby reliving the 
trauma of the experience in an attempt to engage and understand it.42 After the initial 
shock passed and the temporal distance from the moment of ground zero increased, many 
hibakusha accounts of the atomic bombing became more narrative in nature, exploring 
trauma, loss, horror, and human tragedy beyond simply stating details and facts, a 
universal stage in dealing with traumatic experiences, “working over and through” them 
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to better understand their nature as well as the event of their “founding trauma.”43  Later 
hibakusha literature and accounts moved beyond the pure facts, injecting poeticism 
into the stories themselves. There also emerged a new element alongside the event of 
the atomic bombing and the “hell” of their immediate wake: the experience of living as 
people distinctly aware that they are excluded from the greater whole of Japan. The “hell” 
became an experience more often visited in recollections and flashbacks. The present 
became the main story, detailing the lives of hibakusha, their deepening plight as a group 
excluded, alone with their sicknesses that not even they understood. 
This progression of hibakusha attitudes is contradicted by the selective inclusion 
of the atomic bombings into the self-image of Japan solely to give credence to Japan’s 
position as the nation of peace in the deepening Cold War. Instead of being included 
along with the atomic bombings as a point of importance in modern Japan, the hibakusha 
remain almost exactly where SCAP relegated them, “censored,” even while they 
struggled to find their voices and follow the quintessential Japanese mantra of “enduring 
the unendurable,” more poignant for them than for any other people.  
Just the Facts
 The best representative of the earliest stage in hibakusha attitudes towards their 
experience—that of shock, trauma, and repetition as engagement—is the author, poet, 
and hibakusha Tamiki Hara. While his career began before the war, it is his atomic 
bomb-related writing that is considered his finest work, even to the point that some of 
his contemporaries thought the fatalism of the atomic bombing was Hara’s “destined 
theme.”44 In 1947, just two years after the bombing, Hara’s short story “Natsu no Hana,” 
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or “Summer Flowers,” was published despite the censorship of the Occupation. Hara 
wrote the piece based on notes he made within the first thirty-six hours of the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima.45 
 I owe my life to the fact I was in the privy. The morning of August 6 I 
got out of bed at about eight o’clock. The air raid siren had sounded twice the 
previous night, but there had been no air raid: so before daybreak I had taken off 
all my clothes, changed for the first time in a while into sleepwear of yukata and 
shorts, and gone to sleep. When I got out of bed, I had on only the shorts. ... How 
many seconds later it happened I can’t say, but all of a sudden there was a blow 
to my head and everything went dark. ... Things crashed as in a storm, and it was 
pitch dark; I didn’t know what was going on. ...
 ... Surveying the scene from the veranda, I saw an expanse of rubble, 
the ruins of collapsed houses; except for the reinforced concrete building still 
standing in the middle distance, there wasn’t even anything by which to get my 
bearings. The large maple next to the earthen wall—now toppled—of the garden 
had had its trunk snapped about halfway up, and the upper half of the tree had 
been thrown atop the outdoor washstand. Stooping over the air raid shelter, K. 
said, irrationally, “Shall we stick it out here? We’ve got water. . .”46
 The story is objectively told, with the events recounted in a “journalistic” style 
conveying nothing but the facts, and largely omitting any evaluation of them, while also 
avoiding any kind of poetic conflations or conceits despite the fact that Hara was a poet. 
He did write poetry: from the initial notes he made in the aftermath of ground zero he 
composed a series of twenty-three haiku poems.47 John Treat observed in Writing Ground 
Zero that Hara remained “utterly passive before the experience, so much an object of the 
bomb’s force that he does not wonder about its origins.”48 Hara is simply an observer who 
wanders the desolation without ever looking up at the sky. 
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 However, it is incorrect to say “Natsu no Hana” is devoid entirely of any sense of 
poetry. The story remains highly sensory with Hara recording sights, colors, scenic vistas, 
and smells. The effect of his writing is the same as in haiku poetry in that statements are 
short, adjectives are conserved, and extraneous descriptors are kept to a bare minimum 
for maximum impact. Hara uses this haiku-like style throughout the story. Hara also 
keeps the scope of the damage localized, instead of trying for an all-encompassing bird’s 
eye view of the whole ruin of Hiroshima. The first scene of destruction Hara sees is his 
own garden with the retaining wall smashed and the maple tree twisted and broken. 
Leaving his house, he sees that it, too, is destroyed—split asunder—recalling to his mind 
Edgar Allen Poe’s house of Usher. It is precisely because Hara was a poet, having written 
approximately three hundred haiku in his career,49 that the language of “Natsu no Hana” 
is as powerful as it is. If not for the experience of writing poetry, it is doubtful Hara could 
have written the story as he did, a powerful recounting of the moment when he became a 
victim of the first use of atomic weaponry in history.  
 Hara’s goal seems to be to record the extraordinary event without any elaboration 
or fancifulness, giving just cold, hard, indisputable facts through simple images. One 
reason for his factual presentation may be because Hara wrote “Natsu no Hana” during 
the Occupation with its heavy atomic censorship. Hara wanted people to know exactly 
what had happened, and that it did in fact happen at all. Hara defied the censorship to 
have several of his stories published, among them “Natsu no Hana,”50 even though it 
meant he had to seek a publisher willing to risk the censorship. Even though Hara wrote 
his stories by 1946, it is evidence of the censorship in Japan at that time that John Hersey 
was able to publish the first atomic bombing narrative, Hiroshima, in the American “New 
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Yorker” magazine that same year while Hara was still searching for a willing publisher. 
 Hara’s focus on the facts became a main tenet of initial atomic bomb literature. 
It mirrored hibakusha experiences as a whole from 1945 to 1952—the same years as 
the American Occupation—as hibakusha designation depended entirely on the facts: 
distance from the hypocenter, and their radiation level. When censored almost into 
silence, hibakusha authors seemed compelled to record events accurately as a form of 
proof regarding the reality of their experience. Hibakusha authors reclaimed a sense 
of displaced normalcy and humanity at a time when the ABCC was having hibakusha 
brought to their research centers, with military personnel escorts and jeeps, and their 
physical conditions objectively examined—their burns, scars, and radiation levels—after 
which they were dismissed and sent them home. 
 There is no indication in Hara’s writing that anything better can be expected for 
the hibakusha. If Hara was “utterly passive” about the bombing itself, Hara also seems 
just as passive about hibakusha and the position they came to occupy as a group excluded 
from mainstream Japan. For many hibakusha, choosing to continue to survive seems to 
be one of the hardest initial choices to make after the bombing, simply because they had 
witnessed first hand the death of so many family members, friends, and neighbors. The 
question of reintegration from an excluded status is certainly not on Hara’s mind, nor 
the potential of activism or the possibility of any social movements on behalf of those 




Flash before my eyes.51
 Hara seems unable to move on from the trauma, frozen in the moment of 
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the bombing. In fact, Hara did not survive long after writing this haiku. He chose to 
commit suicide as a protest in 1951 by throwing himself in front of a train after hearing 
that nuclear weapons were under consideration for use in the Korean War. The initial 
challenge of the hibakusha was to preserve the facts of their own atomic bombing story, 
and yet, retain enough distance so as not be consumed by those memories, until they had, 
like Hara, an opportunity to record their stories and share their messages and warnings 
regarding atomic weapons and nuclear warfare. As such, hibakusha are not purely 
arguing for personal recognition or to be included, but rather to prevent a reoccurrence of 
the fate that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The Other City
While the city of Hiroshima became the symbol for the atomic bombings and 
the horrific devastation they are capable of, the city of Nagasaki seemed conspicuously 
quiet. Hiroshima was the first city to be bombed by an atomic weapon and boasted a 
larger population at the time of the bombing than Nagasaki, but it nonetheless seems 
inconsistent that Nagasaki is not mentioned nearly as often as Hiroshima. A closer look 
at what should be a strong link between the two atomic cities of Japan reveals two very 
different reactions on each city’s part to becoming ground zero and the first victims of 
the atomic age. These particular reactions are embodied by the two prominent hibakusha 
authors from each city, Tamiki Hara of Hiroshima and Takashi Nagai of Nagasaki. It was 
Hara’s example that prompted hibakusha to see themselves as witnesses of the atomic 
bombing, and similarly it was Nagai who offered the view that the hibakusha experience 
was religiously oriented—in his interpretation of the Nagasaki bombing as Christian 
sacrifices.52 Nagai was not the only proponent of a religious view. Shigenobu Kōji of 
 
52
 Nagai, Takashi. The Bells of Nagasaki. 1949. Trans. William Johnson. New 
York: Kodansha International, 1994. ix-xix, 107.
26
Hiroshima also conveyed a similar sentiment, though Kōji viewed the hibakusha as 
saintly martyrs for the True Pure Land Buddhist sect.53
Takashi Nagai was a scientist and a doctor. Whereas Hara did not “wonder about 
[the bomb’s] origins,”54 Nagai surmised almost immediately that it had been a radiation 
bomb that had been dropped on his city. He had not only read leaflets dropped by the 
Americans in warning, but was also a radiologist and he recognized many of the signs of 
radioactivity in the injuries and types of damage the bomb caused.55 As a man of science, 
the atomic bomb simultaneously fascinated Nagai and shocked him with the hard science 
of the physics involved in the atomic bomb, as well as the sheer amount of destruction 
and death it caused. 
Nagai was also a Japanese Christian, a group that had been excluded from the 
mainstream almost since their religion’s arrival in 1549 with the monk Francis Xavier, 
and had been persecuted heavily and violently during the early Tokugawa period in the 
1600’s. Nagai saw a divine hand at work in the cloud cover over the shipyard of Kokura 
that led the crew of the “Bock’s Car,” the B-29 carrying the second atomic bomb, to 
change their target to Nagasaki, a city that was not even on the priority target list. 
I have heard that the second atomic bomb ... was originally destined 
for another city. But since the sky over that city was covered with clouds, the 
American pilots found it impossible to aim at their target. Consequently, they 
suddenly changed their plans and decided to drop the bomb on Nagasaki, the 
secondary target. ... As the bomb fell, cloud and wind carried it slightly north of 
the munitions factories over which it was supposed to explode and it exploded 
above the cathedral.
... It was the providence of God that carried the bomb to that destination.
Is there not a profound relationship between the destruction of Nagasaki 
and the end of the war? Nagasaki, the only holy place in all of Japan—was it 
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not chosen as a victim, a pure lamb, to be slaughtered and burned on the altar of 
sacrifice to expiate the sins committed by humanity in the Second World War?56
The cathedral over which the “Fat Man” atomic bomb exploded was the center 
of the only sizable Christian community in Japan, and as a result, approximately nine 
thousand of Nagasaki’s total forty to forty-eight thousand estimated initial atomic 
casualties were Christians.57 Nagai considered that the atomic bombing was a continuance 
of the long history persecution of Christians, both for “four hundred years”58 within Japan 
itself and in the world at large for two thousand years. For Nagai, the dead were sacrifice 
on behalf of all humankind, echoing the sense of shared victimhood in that their death 
was made for all people, though in claiming it as such, he interpreted it as the martyrdom 
of an already excluded group—the Nagasaki Christians.  
In parallel with Tamiki Hara, Nagai did not survive long into the postwar period. 
Ironically, Nagai had contracted leukemia before the atomic bomb had even fallen due 
to his work in radiology. He succumbed to radiation complications in the same year as 
Hara’s suicide in 1951. His seminal book on his experience in the atomic bombing, The 
Bells of Nagasaki, was finished in 1946, but just as Hara had found it difficult to publish 
his own atomic bomb related stories, it was not until 1949 that The Bells of Nagasaki was 
finally published. While it resonated strongly in the West, Nagai’s Christian sentiment 
was a distinctly minority opinion in Japan, though it reflected the predominate view 
among Nagasaki Christians. The Japanese Christian hibakusha community was a separate 
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one even among other hibakusha due to their religion, as were the ethnically Korean 
hibakusha, who were also separated form the group of Hiroshima survivors due to their 
ethnic background. Both Christian and Korean hibakusha bore an additional level of 
discrimination beyond that which normal hibakusha endured. 
Nagai’s Christian interpretation of the Nagasaki atomic bombing also separated 
the experience further from that of Hiroshima, a distinction that has extended to the 
present due to the perception of the entire nation that Nagasaki had always been a 
Christian haven, and somehow apart from the rest of the country. However, while the 
sense of martyrdom prevailed for Nagasaki hibakusha in the immediate wake of their 
victimization, it has not remained that way and perhaps perished with Takashi Nagai.59 
The Nagasaki author who made a distinct break from Nagai’s pronouncement 
upon the city’s experience as martyrdom, and also showed a movement away form the 
fact-focused methods of Tamiki Hara, was Nagasaki hibakusha Kyōko Hayashi. Hayashi 
started writing two decades after Hara and Nagai, with her first work achieving print 
in 1967. Atomic bomb related censorship had ended, though the information gathered 
by the ABCC and all other bomb-related material was still being declassified in small 
segments. Hayashi espoused poeticism, which since Hara’s writing, was considered to be 
disingenuous to the reality of the atomic experience.60 
Hayashi’s writing began at a point distant from the event, focusing on life in 
the wake of the bombing instead of the moment of the fires of destruction, presenting 
a frame story instead of a first hand account in which the moment of the atomic bomb 
is visited through memory. Hayashi’s stories are much more fiction than journalism. 
Compared to Hara’s “Natsu no Hana,” the opening segment of Hayashi’s story “Futari no 
Bohyō,” or “Two Grave Markers,” contains no dates or time marks, and even the exact 
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setting beyond the immediately relevant tree and flowers as scenery is unknown. The 
story actually begins with a dream scene that, by its non-reality, can be interpreted more 
symbolically or subjectively than factually. 
Clusters of pale yellow acacia flowers sway in the early summer breeze. 
The wisteria-like clusters call to mind flocks of butterflies.
Wakako sits in the roots of the trees. Her hair is in braids. By her side is a 
baby. The baby wears a rose-colored baby dress and her small hands are open; she 
is dead.
Just like a doll—so sweet, Tsune though. 
Ants swarm around her lips, and maggots crawl in and out of her tear 
ducts.
Her cheeks are still pink, and the baby smiles as if she were tickled. At a 
gentle touch of the finger tips, some of her skin peels off. 
Grease runs from the baby who has started to melt, making just that part 
of the earth glisten, dark with moisture. The cluster of flowers shine lustrously, 
absorbing the juice from the baby’s flesh. 
The wind blows. The baby’s fine hair trembles.
Every day the baby melts and returns to the earth, emanating fragrance and 
nourishing the heavy clusters of acacia blossoms.61 
Kyōko Hayashi is, however, just as interested as Hara was in being a witness 
for the experience of the atomic bombing of her city, rejecting at the same time Nagai’s 
view of martyrdom. The schism between Hayashi and Nagai is the simple fact that Nagai 
traced the bomb back through time to turbulent Christian history in Japan, as well as 
even further back to the persecution in biblical times, while Hayashi traced the atomic 
bombing forward, removing it from the past and transforming it into a continuous state 
that is anything but over, healed, or resolved.62 To Hayashi the atomic bomb’s legacy of 
pain continues, even across generations. Hara, along with Nagai, was caught up in the 
instant of the bombing itself, concerned with the trauma of the event that launched the 
world into the atomic age. They rationalized the suffering to a single event that gave 
it a kind of purpose and meaning. Hayashi further focused on the continuing suffering 
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resulting from the atomic bombing in the form of their mysterious and terrible illnesses 
and their social exclusion. Hayashi asserted that the damage will never be finished, and 
that those afflicted will never stop hurting, mentally or physically. Literary critic John 
Treat remarked that there is no “consoling”63 Hayashi’s victimized characters, and only 
the succor of telling the story and “preserving” her experience in Nagasaki calms the 
pain. 
Hayashi also did not seem interested in reconciling the hibakusha to the 
mainstream of Japan. To have the group subsumed within the larger population seemed 
likely to normalize or erase an element of the hibakusha experience that made it 
important and unique, however painful. Instead, she seemed in favor of the status quo, 
the preservation of the hibakusha position as separate and excluded, if it meant that the 
experience would be preserved in its importance for the future. 
The Quintessential Non-Hibakusha Hibakusha
Hibakusha were, of course, not the only people writing about the atomic 
bombing. John Hersey was not a hibakusha himself, nor even Japanese, but he pieced 
together his 1946 novella, Hiroshima, from first hand accounts and interviews with 
hibakusha. In Japan, it was also a non-hibakusha writer, Masuji Ibuse, who produced 
what is largely considered the staple of atomic bomb literature: Black Rain. Ibuse used 
a similar approach to Hersey, relying on hibakusha accounts and journals to recreate the 
experience of the atomic bombing. He presented the novel, using a frame story structure, 
in which the bombing is visited via journal entries, focusing the main story on the 
difficulties of life in 1950, five years after the atomic bombing. It is a time in which the 
hibakusha struggle for survival against their atomic “disease”64 was made all the more 
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difficult by their position as stigmatized and excluded from Japanese society at large, a 
fact that sapped their will to fight their life-threatening radiation ailments.65 Ibuse’s story 
follows Shigematsu Shizuma, a hibakusha from Hiroshima who raises carp and hopes to 
find a good marriage for his niece, Yasuko.66 However, Yasuko was caught in the fallout 
of the atomic bomb that fell as “black rain,” even though she was outside of Hiroshima 
itself. Because of this, she is continually refused as an acceptable marriage partner by the 
families of the proposed grooms. Shizuma begins compiling his diary to prove Yasuko 
was not in Hiroshima directly, and therefore could not have been affected by the bomb. 
However, perhaps due to the stress of it all, Yasuko’s radiation “disease” symptoms 
begin to manifest. She keeps them secret out of shame while Shizuma tries to prove she 
is healthy, but she is eventually hospitalized as her condition worsens and her health 
fails dramatically. While Shizuma raises his carp, a symbol that Hiroshima can return to 
prosperity, he also maintains the hope that a miracle can restore Yasuko to health, “though 
he knew all the while that it could never come true.”67
Ibuse looked directly at what life after the bomb was like for the hibakusha—a 
continuation of their initial victimization via the persistence of their atomic illnesses in 
a society that was still afraid of those unknown illnesses. This tension is captured in a 
poignant scene where Shizuma and his friend Shōkichi, another hibakusha, are fishing at 
a lake and a passing village woman pauses to comment on their apparent laziness.
“Well, what do you mean, some people are ‘lucky’?” went on the normally 
mild and gentlemanly Shōkichi. “If you mean us, you’re barking up the wrong 
tree. Quite the wrong tree, I can tell you! Come now, woman, let’s see if you can’t 
put things more civilly.”
The tip of his fishing rod was quivering with indignation.
“Look here,” he continued. “We’ve got radiation sickness, and we’re 
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fishing for roach at the doctor’s orders. . . . You think we’re ‘lucky’ to be sick, 
do you? I’d be only too glad to do some work, I can tell you—any amount! But 
people like us have only to do a bit of hard work and their limbs start to rot on 
them. This damned disease comes out.”
“Well, fancy that now . . .! Of course, you wouldn’t be taking advantage 
of being caught in the raid would you?”
“That’s enough! ... I suppose you’ve forgotten how you came to see me 
when I got back from Hiroshima, have you? Or were they crocodile tears? I 
remember you blubbering and calling me a ‘precious victim’ at the time.” 
“Did I now? But that was before the end of the war. Why—everybody said 
that kind of thing during the war.”68
While not a first-hand account, Ibuse still echoes Hara’s style of giving factual 
elements in the representation of the ruined landscape of Hiroshima in flashbacks scenes. 
Ibuse is praised for the “genuineness” of his dialogue and “authentic” detail of his 
account, even though he was a non-hibakusha writing a fictional story. Ibuse is concerned 
with the same issue Hayashi saw as the most important—the continuance of the pain of 
the hibakusha, and their stigmatized and excluded position as a result. He clearly sided 
with Hayashi’s sentiment that the damage is anything but finite. To this end, Ibuse used 
this frame story format to acknowledge the distance between the event of the atomic 
bombing and the time at which the story was written, twenty years apart in 1965, giving 
credence to the continuing travails facing hibakusha in their day to day lives even two 
decades after the atomic bombing itself. 
The most important aspect of Black Rain may be the fact it was deemed 
“accessible” to an audience that was vastly non-hibakusha. Ibuse’s most powerful images 
for many readers remain the journal scenes of the destruction and death caused by the 
atomic bomb, just as such images had been in Hara and Hayashi’s stories. However, 
Ibuse further contrasted the normalcy of the main character, Shizuma, and his family 
life in a small rural village with the horror and almost fantastical nature of the actual 
bombing. He achieved something other than the genre-standard sense of heightened 
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disjunction between the ordinary life of people and the extraordinary event of the atomic 
bombing. Ibuse made the atomic bombing knowable to non-hibakusha. John Treat said 
Ibuse “removed the bombing from the political history in which it is typically inserted,”69 
thereby creating an “authentic” and “politically neutral” account of the atomic bombing. 
Japanese comic book (manga) artist and hibakusha Keiji Nakazawa presented 
an interesting converse for the “neutrality” of Ibuse’s Black Rain in his work. Nakazawa 
gave an unapologetic condemnation of Japan’s wartime conduct and what he saw as the 
“horror of the Emperor system”70 in his series Hadashi no Gen, or Barefoot Gen. Gen’s 
father was a non-conformist who could see Japan’s blunder of the Pacific War as leading 
to ultimate ruin, but because he spoke his mind he was badgered, beaten, and his family 
made outcasts from their community. Nakazawa also depicted hard-line soldiers and 
figures in power as all part of a system of oppression. These characters are mean-spirited, 
selfish people who cheat, swindle, bully, and take from anyone they can for their own 
gains—even in the wake of the bombing—and justify it on the grounds of a perverse 
patriotism.71 Nakazawa also depicted the Americans as cold-hearted and opportunistic, 
having dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima just to see the effects, and thus equally 
condemnable in terms of responsibility for the suffering and horror caused by the atomic 
bomb.72 When Hadashi no Gen was made into an animated series for television, the 
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In sharp contrast, Ibuse did not force the issues of responsibility or culpability 
for the Pacific War or pronouncements of wrongdoing on the part of the Emperor, 
even though he included the broadcast of Emperor Hirohito’s surrender speech and the 
characters’ reactions to it in Shizuma’s journal entry scenes. Ibuse did not blame either 
the Americans or the Japanese for the bombing. Staying focused on the characters and 
their struggles while he omitted the charged political issues, Ibuse stayed non-combative, 
and Black Rain did not polarize its audience between agreement or rejection. As a result, 
Black Rain is praised as, “The most successful book yet written about the greatest single 
horror inflicted by one group of men upon another.”74 
Critical comments made in favor of Black Rain also called other works of 
atomic bomb literature too “strenuously serious.”75 To escape from political assertions 
and politically charged messages in the genre of atomic bomb literature is difficult. 
Even simple statements such as “The bomb was dropped,” or “The bomb fell,” have 
completely different connotations.76 To say “it was dropped” implies an agent that 
brought about the dropping, and an intention, which asserts responsibility for the 
destruction—responsibility that can be attributed to the Japanese government for 
provoking and perpetrating the Pacific War or to the “callousness” of the Americans and 
their decision to use the atomic bomb. Contrarily, saying the bomb “fell” is sometimes 
considered too passive, containing no implication of an agent that did the dropping and 
making the atomic bombing no different from a natural disaster.  
There is a current of feeling in Japanese society that maintains that any hibakusha 
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which they were treated is stepping beyond their place and is therefore “radical,” and 
“dissident.” John Treat observed that many Japanese conservative literature critics also 
joined in the praise for the lack of politics in Black Rain.77 Black Rain seems to have 
contained something “acceptable” to conservatives within the content or the perceived 
message in the text itself, and by extension, that it did in actuality contain a political 
message: a conservative one. Lending credence to this idea, it is should be noted that 
Ibuse was also a propaganda writer for the Japanese government during World War II. It 
is entirely possible to trace a propagandistic sentiment in Black Rain where the hibakusha 
are living examples of having to “endure the unendurable,” just as Emperor Hirohito 
urged as the appropriate response to Japan’s surrender. Ibuse described the surrender 
speech’s effects as causing tears and a creating sense of solidarity in the face of defeat. 
There is no outrage or sudden outburst of long-held angst directed at the government. 
Treat also wrote that these conservative critics used the “merits” of Ibuse’s novel to attack 
the works of other authors as leftists with a political agenda and therefore disingenuous 
to the experience of the atomic bomb. These critics directly link Hirohito’s surrender 
speech to the perception of the atomic bombings as an injury to the whole of Japan, 
instead of just to those killed directly and the hibakusha. This assertion also assumed 
an understanding and a stewardship of the bombing itself that is just as authentic as 
the hibakusha claim to the experience, a view that underscores the marginalization the 
hibakusha experienced as the excluded. 
Ibuse is controversial in some ways within the genre of atomic bomb literature, 
primarily since he is not a hibakusha himself and yet he produced what is widely 
regarded to be the quintessential hibakusha narrative. He emphasized a similarity 
between victims and non victims, at the same time that he presents “neutrality.” Before 
Black Rain it can be argued that the modus operandi in atomic bomb literature was to 
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stress dissimilarity between hibakusha and ordinary people, pointing out that they had 
undergone an experience unknowable to non-victims. This attitude that hibakusha were 
somehow apart from the main body of the population undoubtedly complicated their 
treatment by society. If it is impossible to understand what they went through, why even 
make the attempt? Ibuse showed, as evidenced by the success of Black Rain, that it 
was possible to identify with hibakusha as he effectively drew his readers into the story 
and struggle of his characters. Ibuse’s “neutral” approach, while effective, was at odds 
with that of Hayashi and other hibakusha who felt that to normalize and render ordinary 
the experience of the hibakusha was analogous to giving in to the desires of those who 
sought to erase it all together. 
Activism or Silence
Just as the hibakusha are not a single homogenous group, a single method of 
expression for their collective set of concerns could not adequately satisfy everyone. 
There are hibakusha who have become introverted because of their experiences to the 
point they prefer not to or cannot speak about it. Physical, psychological, and medical 
problems due to their atomic bomb related ailments, ranging from keloid scarring to 
leukemia and other cancers, afflict many hibakusha. For years after the bombing, the 
lack of information regarding radiation related sicknesses led to a belief that other people 
could catch atomic bomb “diseases.” Some companies refused to hire hibakusha, though 
other reasons were supplied for declining their applications.78 There was also the fear that 
if hibakusha were to have children they might have unsavory mutations or inherit their 
 78
 Terkel, Studs. The Good War: An Oral History of World War II. New York: The 
New Press, 1997. 299. Lifton, Robert Jay. Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1991. 187-191. Braw, Monika. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 
The Voluntary Silence.” Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts 
in the Nuclear Age. Eds. Hein, Laura, and Selden, Mark. New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 
1997. 160-162.
37
parent’s atomic bomb illnesses.79 Hibakusha themselves worried about such things. Keiji 
Nakazawa wrote that he felt anxious upon the birth of his two children, and later on at 
the birth of his grandchildren.80 Such “hibakusha-phobia” is a prominent theme in works 
like Ibuse’s Black Rain, and Nakazawa’s Hadashi no Gen. Nakazawa gave the example 
of a family that shunned their own relative because of his hibakusha status and injuries, 
keeping him out of sight and pretending he no longer existed while waiting for him to 
die, hiring Gen to take care of him.81
By the time the American Occupation ended in 1952 and the possibility for 
public action to address their issues became possible, the hibakusha had already been 
marginalized and stigmatized for seven years. In 1954 when the Lucky Dragon no. 5 
incident generated a wave of public concern for the lingering atomic issues that the 
first atomic bomb related social movement, Gensuikyō, came to be. While one goal 
stated for movement was “relief and solidarity for the hibakusha,”82 for Gensuikyō 
the term hibakusha also included those contaminated by fallout in the Bikini Island 
test, such as the fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon no. 5, as well as residents of the 
Marshall Islands, in the count alongside Hiroshima and Nagasaki hibakusha. Just as 
Gensuikyō was politically diverse at its formation with no one group a vast majority, it 
did not contain a high hibakusha membership, if any. Gensuikyō seemed more focused 
on indirect aid to the hibakusha, increasing awareness of the hibakusha situations and 
appeals, championing them rather than explicitly including them. 
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A hibakusha-specific movement did form in 1956 called the Japan Confederation 
of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers Organization, or Hidankyō. At their inception 
they proclaimed that they felt “born again” with the renewed interest in atomic bomb 
related issues, and that it was time to raise their voices on behalf of those “who have 
had no voices, who have died continually since the cruel moment of the atomic bomb 
because of radiation sicknesses”83 in order to be heard by the world. Keiji Nakazawa 
said, however, that Hidankyō was splintered internally, and even more importantly, that it 
couldn’t integrate with, or even form a coalition with Gensuikyō, lessening their potential 
power to create change.84 This was due to the fact Gensuikyō had become dominated by 
the political left after getting heavily involved in the 1960 demonstrations against the 
unilateral ratification of Anpo, the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, by Prime 
Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Both Hidankyō and Gensuikyō lost solidarity and momentum 
by failing to join together, remaining strangely separate even though they strove for the 
same ideal: abolition of nuclear weapons. 
Across Japan the fervor surrounding atomic and hydrogen weaponry in the 1950’s 
was eventually buried under the 1960 crisis concerning the renewal of the Anpo treaty. 
Gensuikyō proved unable to reconcile internal political divisions and split, forming an 
offshoot branch, the Gensuikin, or the Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen 
Bombs. Though he was just a reporter at the time, Kenzaburō Ōe was present at the 
1963 Ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and watched the 
split occur. The issue was between the JCP and JSP factions within the Gensuikyō, with 
the JCP arguing that Russia, rather absurdly, should be exempt from any plans of total 
nuclear weapon bans. In the essays Ōe wrote during his time in Hiroshima, collected 
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as Hiroshima Notes, he began to see a dire inconsistency in the concern of the political 
elements in the Gensuikyō who squabbled with one another while the hibakusha weakly 
waved to the crowds and gave small statements and speeches even as they sickened 
further when out of the public eye. 
Once the conference ended, Ōe’s writing became more focused on the 
hibakusha. He began reporting about how hibakusha retained their “human dignity”85 
to an impressive degree, and helped inform his own sense of this “vital attribute” as he 
confronted the harder issues in his own life, including having a brain-damaged child.86 
I have already written, for example, about the stubborn resistance of 
an angry old man who attempted suicide to protest the resumption of nuclear 
testing; of how his suicide attempt failed and his protest was ignored; and of 
how he finally felt exposed to dishonor. I think that he surely had human dignity, 
despite his sense of failure. It is dignity like his that captivates my mind. To put 
it bluntly, he was left with nothing but human dignity. When I think of the old 
man’s failed suicide, his ignored protest, his long time abed in the hospital, and 
then try to identify what significance such a life had, the answer is clear: the value 
of his life lay precisely in the human dignity that he achieved in his miserable old 
age. Reduced to lying in a hospital bed with a big scar on his abdomen, still he 
could face with dignity all people without keloid scars, that is to say, all people 
everywhere who had no experience of the atomic bomb.87
In his writing, Ōe seemed well aware of the exclusion of the hibakusha and the 
barriers to their dignity that it presented. What he found remarkable was present even 
in hibakusha deaths: “clear rejections of a deceptive nation, and [affirmations] of the 
surviving people.”88 Ōe also contrasted this “pure” attitude by stating that “mankind 
in general has a common sense of guilt toward Hiroshima.” What Ōe created for the 
hibakusha was not inclusion via freedom from their stigmatization, or even broad 
 
85
 Ōe, Kenzaburō. Hiroshima Notes. 1965. Trans. David L. Swain and Toshi Yone-
zawa. New York: Marion Boyars, 1995. 99, 106, 151.
 86
 Ōe, Kenzaburō. Hiroshima Notes. 1965. Trans. David L. Swain and Toshi Yone-
zawa. New York: Marion Boyars, 1995. 12, 95.
 
87
 Ōe, Kenzaburō. Hiroshima Notes. 1965. Trans. David L. Swain and Toshi Yone-
zawa. New York: Marion Boyars, 1995. 98-99.
 88
 Ōe, Kenzaburō. Hiroshima Notes. 1965. Trans. David L. Swain and Toshi Yone-
zawa. New York: Marion Boyars, 1995. 153.
40
normalization, but rather idealization. While atomic bomb writers such as Ibuse focused 
on the knowable and identifiable elements of the struggles of hibakusha in order to 
generate a familiarity with which any Japanese person could feel a connection, Ōe 
elevated them by their very exclusion and their transcendence of the challenges brought 
on by their atomic bomb-related illnesses. 
 Perhaps in an endeavor to redefine the portrait of the hibakusha, Ōe presented a 
sense of existentialist and humanist sentiment for their situation. However, it may also be 
questioned how much the existential concept of “freedom” applies to hibakusha. Merely 
being a hibakusha created a second unassailable truth in their lives, right alongside the 
one Jean Paul Sartre says exists for all people, that of the inevitability of death.89 A third 
factor in the lives of hibakusha was their exclusion from regular Japanese society, which 
limited their choices in every situation including how they dealt with their own atomic 
illnesses and eventual death. Ōe is an exemplar of a different side to hibakusha activism, 
representing the desire of non-hibakusha to champion the afflicted. In praising them for 
being human while under such extreme circumstances, however altruistically, there is a 
disregard on Ōe’s part for the wishes of the hibakusha as victims to want or require any 
assistance or attention, in effect objectifying them in their struggles. This was a major 
criticism of Ōe’s work, even from some of his personal friends90 who contended that Ōe 
should not have forced those who did not want to speak to do so, especially because he 
was a non-hibakusha who could never fully understand why they might choose to do so. 
Part of the respect for hibakusha should, in the opinion of these hibakusha, be to let them 
keep their silence undisturbed, not even acting as a voice for them. Another contingent 
among the hibakusha community was upset about Ōe’s omission of an agent that caused 
the atomic bombing and ongoing ostracism, an element they felt was conspicuously 
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absent in the Notes.91
John Treat said Ōe made the “point insistently” that hibakusha were just as 
much on the outside of Japanese society as “Blacks in American, Jews in Europe.”92 
However, Ōe moored his humanist sentiment in the belief that Japan collectively owned 
the experience of the atomic bombing, just as Hirohito had asserted in 1945. Ōe does 
not make it a universal, world-link. To him, the hibakusha and the atomic bombing are 
indeed a quintessentially Japanese experience, a fact he is grateful for in the same way 
he finds hibakusha dignified—only in the Japanese cultural context can hibakusha be 
free from the contrary notion to dignity: shame and guilt. A Christian, western context 
would, in Ōe’s sentiment, condemn the “dignified” suicides of the hibakusha, or prevent 
them entirely, by inspiring “guilt or fear of hell.”93 He likewise finds “courage” in the 
“morality” of “Hiroshima people ‘who do not kill themselves in spite of their misery.’”94
Some hibakusha have disagreed with the claim of “Japaneseness” for the atomic 
bomb experience. These survivors asserted that all people, not just Japanese people, 
should know what they experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ōe did mention one 
such person in the Notes, an older Korean hibakusha who over time lost her feelings of 
anger toward the Americans for dropping the bomb, and toward the Japanese government 
for the war that brought the atomic bombing as a consequence. In place of her anger she 
found a desire to make sure that the use of atomic weaponry never happened again.
Now I do not curse America or hate Japan. ... I only want to appeal for 
the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs. This I want to do because I am a 
mother who lost five children; it has nothing to do with whether I am Korean or 
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Japanese.95 
It may be on humanist terms that the hibakusha can find a measure of 
reintegration to society. Historically, the initial reaction to events of mass violence has 
been to re-humanize the victims, embracing them, healing them, and assisting them to 
cope. In the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the hibakusha were directly targeted by 
stigmatization, censorship, and discrimination, which made what should have been a 
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MINAMATA
Exclusion After Year Zero
While Minamata victims’ circumstances are admittedly not as dramatic as those 
of the hibakusha, and the number of those affected is far less than those who were killed 
or irradiated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those who were poisoned in Minamata were 
nonetheless victims of a situation beyond their control, and they were excluded in their 
own community as well as ignored by the mainstream of Japan society. The stage for the 
ecological disaster that occurred in the small costal town of Minamata had been set prior 
to 1945, with victims appearing as early as the 1930’s. The situation did not come to a 
head, however, until the postwar, post-Occupation years. 
The source of harm for the people of Minamata was not an intentional one, such 
as an atomic bomb dropped on their city. Instead, the people in Minamata were poisoned 
by untreated industrial mercury waste that was pumped by the Chisso Kabushiki Kaisha, 
or Chisso Chemical Company (known prior to 1965 as Nihon Chisso Hiryō Kabushiki 
Kaisha, or the Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company, Nichitsu for short), into Minamata 
Bay where it spread through the water and the fish, killing the marine and plant life in and 
around the bay. By eating the fish and using contaminated water, the people of the city 
also became sick. The mercury poisoning accumulated in their nervous systems over time 
to toxic levels because such poisoning increases in concentrations as it moves up the food 
chain from fish to humans, eventually leaving the victims shaking, paralyzed, or even 
brain damaged. It is estimated that the toxic mercury waste released into Minamata Bay 
may have affected over thirty thousand residents, and as many as two hundred thousand 
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to two million people along Japan’s Shiranui Sea who ingested potentially contaminated 
fish.96 
Nichitsu was founded in 1906 and had a long history in Minamata, establishing 
its main factory there in 1918. Before the Occupation of Japan, Nichitsu had been a 
zaibatsu—a gigantic, government-condoned monopoly. The chemicals it produced had 
also been important for the Japanese war effort, especially in the field of explosives and 
munitions. Emperor Hirohito himself made a visit to Minamata to inspect the Nichitsu 
plant before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Nichitsu’s Minamata plant was also 
significant because, while it was bombed extensively,97 it was the only one of Nichitsu’s 
facilities to remain largely operational and also in the company’s possession after the 
American Occupation. The Minamata facility became Nichitsu’s flagship. 
Once a salt-making village, work at Nichitsu’s plant filled in for Minamata 
citizens when the salt industry died down in the Meiji period, eventually becoming one 
of two main sources of employment with the only other being fishing. Fishing families, 
and other lower income households who had to subsist off locally caught fish, would 
be the ones most dramatically effected by the complications that came to be known as 
“Minamatabyō,” or “Minamata disease,” as well as by the environmental devastation the 
poisoning wrought as it killed off the sea life in Minamata Bay itself and withered the 
shoreline. 
With local marine life devastated by the mercury poisoning, the fisher folk began 
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to suffer, first from the diminishing of their livelihoods, and then from the insidious 
sickness creeping through their community. At first it was the cats that seemed to be 
going crazy, “dancing” and yowling without cause,98 but then human beings also began 
to manifest symptoms of a similar illness. More and more people began to feel numbness 
creeping through their bodies and began to suffer headaches. It was not until 1956 that 
doctors from the nearby city of Kumamoto undertook an analysis of the potential causes 
of the sicknesses in Minamata after observing multiple cases in a single family. Their 
research pointed to something in the waste Nichitsu was discharging—specifically methyl 
mercury used as the catalyst in the production of acetaldehyde. The mercury had been in 
use since 1932 at the Minamata plant.99 
The official designation of the sick people of Minamata as sufferers from 
“Minamata disease” came in 1956, but the exact culprit for the poisoning was not fully 
identified until 1959: Nichitsu’s waste. However, once the shocking news that Nichitsu’s 
discharge was crippling and causing the death of people in Minamata, the first request 
seeking official compensation from Nichitsu came not from victims explicitly of 
Minamata disease, but rather from the fishermen who sought reparations for their loss 
of profit from diminishing fishing catches. A mutual aid society on behalf of the victims 
of the disease, which included many fishermen and their families, did form, however, 
and did submit a request for victims’ compensation alongside the demands of the fishing 
industry. 
In the face of rising public concern, Nichitsu also undertook studies to determine 
if their plant or its by-products was indeed the cause. When the results indicated that 
their waste was indeed poisonous, and had caused the death of wildlife and sickness 
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and death in humans, Nichitsu began to act quickly. Taking responsibility posed a 
myriad of consequences for the company, many of which would, by necessity, lead to 
a great deal of work on treatment options, the expenditure of large amounts of money 
for compensation, and a loss of consumer and investor confidence, as well as national 
prestige. Nichitsu decided the financial loss that taking blame entailed was unacceptable. 
Nichitsu was one of the flagship companies for the postwar Japanese government’s focus 
on economic expansion as the means to the recovery of the country, an essential part of 
the new Japanese self-image as a strong, industrial economy. The government itself was 
therefore unwilling to let the blame fall on Nichitsu. Nichitsu’s tactics became to “delay” 
and “confuse” the issue.100 The company released misleading information to the media, 
played opinion against opinion within the community, and contradicted the statements of 
the Kumamoto doctors by releasing their own report made by an in-house scientific team. 
Even with the blame placed on Nichitsu for this ecological disaster, the residents 
of the Minamata community still largely sided with the company. To many residents of 
Minamata, Nichitsu was the bulwark of the town’s livelihood. These residents accused 
the fishermen and the Minamata disease victims of attacking the very heart of their own 
town’s prosperity. This communal sentiment of sympathy for Nichitsu, combined with 
Nichitsu’s determination to obfuscate their responsibility for Minamata disease, pushed 
the victims into exclusion. Nichitsu—much in the same way that SCAP policy solidified 
the position of the hibakusha on the periphery by virtue of censoring or providing no 
official recognition of their existence—only recognized the claims of the fisherman, and 
awarded vaguely worded “sympathy payments” to those who also had family members 
affected by Minamata disease.  Nichitsu’s denial, and the support of the community for 
that denial, resulted in the stigmatization of the victims of Nichitsu’s poisoning into a 
group of excluded people. Neighbors were often afraid of Minamata disease victims 
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for fear of contagion, and when adults with the disease produced seriously deformed 
offspring, fear of marrying into a stricken family grew. Most of those affected at first 
were fishermen living in small clusters along the bay, those without any political clout in 
a community that was tied to a single, major employer, Chisso.101 With the community 
divided, Nichitsu was free to make its case on a broader level. The company began to 
argue that anything that could blacken its name and thus its ability to be successful would 
have dire repercussions not only for the economy of Minamata, but for the nation as 
a whole and would be done at the cost of national economic expansion and the policy 
adopted in year zero to return Japan to a position of prominence via economic growth and 
industry. Minamata, as well as other major pollution disasters in Japan which occurred 
in the same time frame,102 showed that this economic recovery was to be carried out 
regardless of the costs to human health and life. In the case of Minamata, the cost in 
lives would only increase over time due to the company’s stalling tactics and avoidance 
of blame. In this conflict, Nichitsu only budged a little, handing out a small amount of 
monetary compensation to the fishermen’s groups while securing a promise from them 
not to pursue the matter further, even if the case developed and new information came to 
light. However, the activity of 1959 would not end the issue, for no real resolution was 
achieved, and no responsibility was taken.  
The second phase of the Minamata case began in earnest in 1965. This time, 
others Japanese began to take interest in Minamata as the dissatisfaction of the fishermen 
with the initial settlement from Nichitsu increased and new victims afflicted by Minamata 
disease began to appear, even after Nichitsu’s supposed safe guards were put in place. By 
this time, Nichitsu had changed the company’s name to “Chisso,” most likely to avoid 
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the connection with Minamata disease and the initial case findings regarding the mercury 
poisoning. 
The small numbers of community members involved in the resurgence of 
Minamata protests remained the same, but now they were joined by outside participants. 
Many of the newcomers had experience in other social protests such as those movements 
involved in the Anpo unrest of 1960. The involvement of other Japanese led to the 
erosion of the ideas that Minamata was on the periphery and thus less important, and that 
the fisherman and the Minamata disease victims as group were somehow non-Japanese.
A “Strange Disease”
Just as hibakusha authors and other writers gave voice to their unique experiences 
as victims and excluded, a member of the Minamata community, though not a disease 
victim herself, Michiko Ishimure, wrote on behalf of the fishermen and the victims of 
Minamata disease. She explicitly took up their cause from the standpoint of a kataribe, 
or a witness of historical events and speaker on behalf of those who have no voice 
themselves. This self-titling had a very practical side. Because the bodies of victims of 
mercury poisoning are crippled and their senses eroded and eventually destroyed, leaving 
them truly blind and mute, there was a definite need for someone to become the voice of 
those who could no longer articulate their own situations, experiences, and life stories. 
She attempted to depict her own community’s struggles with the mercury poisoning by 
documenting the daily lives of those who became increasingly stigmatized as “poisoned 
people.” 
The whole village was in turmoil. Our well, garden and house, even the 
jars of miso and pickled radish, and the pots and pans in the kitchen had to be 
thoroughly disinfected by order of the Public Health Department. 
The panic in the village reminded me of the cholera epidemic many years 
earlier. Now I could neither buy the things I needed, nor get water from anyone, 
because everyone feared contamination. When I went to the local store, the store 
keeper wouldn’t take the money, so I ended up putting it on the floor. He must 
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have picked it up with chopsticks, and boiled it several times over before putting 
it away. I will never forget our neighbors refused to give me water. We were 
ostracized by the whole village.103 
Ishimure followed Masuji Ibuse’s method in writing Black Rain: presenting the 
fishermen and Minamata disease victims as ordinary, understandable Japanese people, 
as well as coequal members of the Minamata community itself. Time and point of view 
are free-flowing for Ishimure. She moves from one family to another in her narrative, 
showing the non-congenital victims often before and after the disease set in. What she 
finds in their survival and persistence reflects what Ōe had seen in the hibakusha —a quiet 
courage and “human dignity.”104 Ishimure’s characters further reflect those in Ibuse’s 
Black Rain, such as in the fishing scene with Shizuma and his friend  Shōkichi; the 
victims only wishes are that they could even just do a day’s work once more, or in other 
words, as one of one of Ishimure’s chapters is titled “I Want to be Human Again.” 
“I want to get my own body back, the way it was before. I want to go back 
to the strong, healthy body with which I came into the world. I’ve never been 
sick. I’ve never had to stay in bed. I was brimming with energy. I could work 
harder than any man. 
“It used to be so lovely out on the sea. I want nothing else, just to be like I 
was before I got this strange disease. To be able to row a boat, and to land a net. I 
feel so miserable now, a helpless wretch with a body like a freak.”105 
Ishimure also depicts the congenital patients in the same manner Ōe had with the 
hibakusha, as idealizations, even in their crippled, poisoned states.
Sister, our Mokutarō is a saint. He never disobeys us. He can’t speak, 
can’t use his hands to eat, can’t go to the toilet by himself. But he can see, and has 
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unusually sharp hearing. Besides, his soul is deep and mysterious like the ocean. 
... He just sits there, smiling like a Buddha statue, and trying hard not to get on 
our nerves.106 
To Ishimure, and as evidenced by her book’s subtitle, “Our Minamata Disease,” 
the mercury poisoning was a community problem, not just a struggle for the victims 
themselves and their immediate families. Because of Minamata’s extended period of 
mercury contamination and the fact that the mercury concentrations and even more 
severe effects are carried on to the second generation, the damages were anything but 
finite or concluded, despite Nichitsu’s declaration that the problem resolved following 
the 1960 settlement and plant improvements. These facts have certainly contributed to 
Ishimure’s adoption of the role of kataribe, speaking on behalf the Minamata victims who 
have lost the ability to do so for themselves, but also as a living record in the vein of oral 
traditions. 
Another Minamta resident and poisoning victim, Masato Ōgata, chose a similar 
approach when narrating his memoir, choosing consciously to make it a kioku, a direct 
memory, as opposed to a kiroku, a record. He explained the choice: “Once you record an 
event, both the event and the act of documentation are considered complete and final, a 
part of the past. But kioku is a living process. ... The Minamata incident must never be 
filed or shelved. It must remain alive in our collective memories.”107 
Beyond the role of kataribe, Ishimure was also highly concerned with the factual 
recording of the first fifteen years of the disease, especially when the blame began to 
fall on Nichitsu and the facts became much more murky as a result. Ishimure also took 
an activist approach to raise awareness of those suffering from both the ruination of 
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Minamata Bay’s ecology and those who were effected by the mercury poisoning itself, as 
well as to explicate the vulnerability of the fishermen due to their societal position, for the 
victims of Minamata disease not only faced bodily stigmatization due to their ailments, 
but because many were fishermen, they faced a stigma within their community as a result 
of this periphery, lower-income status. Japan had chosen the image of an agrarian, rice-
based farming society as the core of its traditional self-image, ascribing it as a “defining” 
feature of nearly every group theorized to have settled Japan.108 It remained an important 
component of the revised self-image of Japan following 1945. Ogata, too, made mention 
of the discrepancy between fishers and farmers.
Traditionally, farmers have felt superior to fishermen and have looked 
down their noses at them. It was not until after the war, when net fishing for 
sardines became popular, that the fishing industry blossomed. Until that time, 
fisherman definitely occupied the bottom rung. For one thing, fishermen were 
very poor, and their lives unstable.109
In several additional layers of discrimination,  fisher folk were easily discounted 
and ignored by Nichitsu because they were not company employees. On a larger scale, 
the fishermen were also distinctly on the periphery of the government’s concerns because 
they were not part of the LDP’s constituent power base in the rural farming communities. 
In Minamata itself, lower-income fishing families struck by the disease were not only 
separated from the city at large in their own hamlets, but also in terms of social class.
In the mid 1960’s it was not just Minamata’s tragedy alone that began to evidence 
the effects of unrestrained industry. Minamata was also not a unique case of industrial 
poisoning and pollution. For example, the city of Niigata had its own Minamatabyō 
outbreak in 1965.110 The company involved was Shōwa Denkō, another member of 
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 The other two tragedies of industrial pollution beyond Minamata and Niigata 
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a former zaibatsu group, which was also using a mercury catalyst in their chemical 
production process, just as Nichitsu in the Minamata plant.111 However, the settlement in 
favor of the victims of the Niigata pollution case came to a favorable conclusion for the 
victims much more quickly than in Minamata. This may have been because the Shōwa 
Denkō factory was not part of the community it polluted, unlike Chisso in Minamata, 
which allowed for more solidarity within the community in support of the victims. 
It may also have been because Niigata was closer to the nation’s population centers 
geographically on the main island of Honshū, and in terms of public consciousness 
compared to Minamata, which lay on the periphery far to the west on the island of 
Kyūshū. Niigata’s Minamata disease case was settled in only a few years and recognized 
far more victims than the earlier settlement of the Minamata case.112 
Because of Niigata’s Minamata disease outbreak, Chisso and the government 
were forced to once again recognize and deal with the plight of Minamata City. With 
the need to award compensation finally undeniable, due to the government’s official 
acknowledgement of both the disease and the Chisso plant as the cause of that disease 
in 1968—a result almost certainly the outcome of the Niigata case—settlements were 
unavoidable. Chisso had to turn to the government for financial support. Loans were 
granted, and while the reparations were haggled down to rather meager levels once 
again, they were at least awarded in exchange for another guarantee that the current 
settlement would be the end of the matter. Just as with the hibakusha and official lists 
for compensation and recognition, some families affected by Minamata disease did not 
seek to claim reparations for fear of community reactions. In actuality, the number of 
mercury poisoning include the Toyama cadmium poisoning and Yokkaichi sulfur and 
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victims registered is more representative of the number of households that were affected, 
rather than individuals.113 This settlement did not spare the head of Chisso and the factory 
plant manager at the time of the initial outbreak of the disease in 1956 from criminal 
prosecution later in the 1970’s.114 Chisso’s use of the mercury catalyst ceased in 1968.115 
It had been discharged via waste into Minamata Bay for thirty-six years. 
Bound by Iron Triangles
Historian Timothy George observed that in the Minamata case the movements 
for the fishermen and the victims struggled against an “iron triangle” of big business, 
bureaucracy, and the LDP.116 This omitted one of the most important factors in the 
Minamata victims’ exclusion: the Minamata community that sided with the polluter 
Chisso, a factor which loomed larger than the LDP’s involvement in the situation.117 
A similar triangle of factors for the exclusion of atomic bomb victims can be 
constructed: the lack of information due to censorship about the atomic bombings and 
related illnesses, the bureaucracy that continued to support that lack of information and 
apathy, and the community in which the hibakusha existed which kept them separate 
because of general disinterest, stigmatization, and fear. This “iron triangle” gives a more 
accurate picture of all the factors that there were involved in the Minamata victims case 
as well. In both the hibakusha and Minamata victims’ circumstances the true tragedy was 
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that, “the victims—not the disease [or its agent]—were now seen as the threat.”118
While the persistence of fishermen and victim groups has resulted in gains against 
the “iron triangle” for compensation, the situation of those afflicted with Minamata 
disease, along with the need for the recognition of thousands more who were affected, 
has still to be fully resolved. The government emphasis on large state supported 
“economy building” projects that came to represent the way to prosperity. The resulting 
“income-doubling” was only curtailed when enough pollution incidents began to overrun 
the good intentions, resulting in the 1970 pollution laws, a minor victory in that much of 
the complaints were “bought off” with monetary compensation and considered as “dealt 
with.” As a result, the tragedy of Minamata, just as it was for the hibakusha, was to have 
the two principle agents who ought to comfort and care for victims—the local community 
in which they lived, and their national government—turn away and exclude them. It 
was ironic that Minamata disease victims were accused of detracting from the welfare 
of their city by seeking damages from Chisso, when Chisso itself was doing harm while 
contributing to Japanese national “progress” following year zero.119 The culpability of 
the state-supported industry in the tragedy cannot be ignored, and it is the continuance 
of the attempt to solidify responsibility for the disaster that prompts Minamata disease 
victims to speak out, even over fifty years after the “discovery” of the disease, its source 
as Chisso’s waste, and the initial compensation in 1959.
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The compassion the hibakusha and the mercury poisoned in Minamata should 
have inspired in their fellow Japanese was often subsumed by national agendas, a lack 
of information, and a general apathy. It is especially poignant that Japan was engaged 
in defining its new self-image as a democracy, where ostensibly all the people were 
included, just at the time this exclusion was occurring. It was more possible at this 
time than at any other in Japan’s history for all its people to find a voice through its 
new government. Instead, the Japanese government, and indeed Japanese society, 
seemed content to ignore troubling issues, tacitly condoning historical Revisionism. 
This disturbing trend has been carried out in the educational system via textbooks 
that “minimize” the culpability of Japan in incurring the atomic bombings and the 
responsibility of the Japanese militaristic state for Pacific War, under the guise of 
promoting “‘patriotism’ in public schools.”120 As such, while the image of democracy in 
postwar Japan has been one of “peace” and “economic progress” via the close coupling 
of government backed capitalist development, these two features have been achieved by 
exclusion—not only of groups of people, but also of ideas that conflict with this image.
Even in 2010, sixty-five years after the reformation of Japan into a democracy, 
the exclusion of significant groups continues. This pertains not only to the hibakusha 
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and Minamata victims, but also to domestic minorities like Burakumin, Ainu, Koreans, 
Chinese, and even the Okinawans. New groups have been added to the “list” of excluded, 
including foreign workers in Japan. Companies are reluctant to hire any foreigner except 
to fill language consultant or teaching positions. In April 2009 Latin American workers, 
many of whom were Brazilians of Japanese descent, were asked to leave the country with 
a travel stipend and to “never return” to seek work again in Japan.121 This came at a time 
when the Japanese domestic labor pool was considered to be in peril due to the aging of 
the country’s population, many of whom were not only preparing to retire, but were also 
in need of health professionals to care for them. An LDP “senior lawmaker” justified this 
paid deportation because of “rising unemployment” and also commented, “I do not think 
that Japan should ever become a multi ethnic society.”122
The government (embodied in the LDP) alone is not responsible for the 
continuation of exclusion, since just as George pointed to an “iron triangle” of factors 
involved in the Minamata situation, the experiences of the excluded show that there 
are many sources for their ostracism and lack of recognition. Even among groups that 
championed the victims as a major goal, it is possible to find traces of an exclusive 
sentiment. Just as the Hidankyō and the Gensuikyō could neither merge nor form a 
coalition, it was an artificial distinction that separated and weakened fishermen groups 
and Minamata disease victims groups who shared the same stance on key issues, and 
 yet could never achieve solidarity. This was compounded by the recognition and even 
the wording of the compensation handed out in both the hibakusha and Minamata 
victims’ cases, which only provided temporary placation, essentially “buying off” victims 
while the real issues remained unaddressed to the point that a resolution, let alone any 
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definitive responsibility, was impossible to find. The harshest aspect to the exclusion of 
both hibakusha and Minamata victims was found at  “ground level.” While top down 
recognition and compensation can make a difference in the quality of lives and the care 
victims receive, it does not overcome the separation that the hibakusha and Minamata 
disease victims found within their own neighborhoods. Exclusion can be seen as a 
significant failure of government, both at a local and at a national level, to recognize 
the rights of all of its citizens, and instead to count some as less valuable than others. 
Just as in all cases of exclusion, there is a “curious and troubling inversion of reality.”123 
Those who were victimized were often those who came to be considered the threat or the 
contaminated, as happened with both the hibakusha and the Minamata victims. This was 
a literal fear of contagion from these groups within their own communities. 
To combat the voids of information and the resulting stigmatization of the victims, 
writers who addressed the situations of the hibakusha and Minamata victims have sought 
to facilitate understanding and compassion. For the hibakusha and those who wrote 
about them, it was important to preserve the individual and collective experiences of the 
survivors as victims and as excluded. Masuji Ibuse clearly demonstrated that there is 
substance to an approach that humanized the hibakusha, confronting both exclusion and 
victimization head on, even if it failed to absolutely preserve the hibakusha experience as 
a unique, largely unknowable one to the extent Hayashi might have preferred. Similarly, 
Michiko Ishimure depicted the victims of Minamata disease as quintessential human, 
deserving of both compassion and capable of eliciting sympathy.
The issue of preservation of the experiences of the excluded is more important 
today than ever as the number of those affected in both groups dwindles due to age and 
the complications of their poisoning. The atomic bomb museums in both Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, as well as the Minamata “data hall,” have endeavored to record testimonies 
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of survivors and to collect diaries, statistics, and artifacts related to the bombings and 
the mercury contamination for their archives. The process is not always conducive 
to the goal. As communities and nations try to come to terms with traumatic events 
there is an attempt to memorialize them, often through what is essentially an erroneous 
representation of the victims’ stories due to incomplete information or to the fact that no 
responsibility to, or meaning for, the suffering of the victims is ever provided. Victims 
sometimes regard these memorials as another manifestation of their “voicelessness,” even 
seeing them as a co-opting of their experience by other groups that do not necessarily 
have their best interests in mind. This is evidenced in both the Minamata Disease Data 
Hall’s “official” selection of materials and photographs to exhibit and Hiroshima’s 
politically oriented “commemorations” and the response of some victims towards them.124 
Even abroad, preservation is an issue. In America, the attitude has remained that 
the use of the atomic bombs was justified, and just as there was censorship in Japan, there 
has also been an almost self-imposed censorship in America especially in regards to the 
victims of those bombs. Even in 2010, sixty-five years after the bombing, documents 
and pictures are still being declassified. America also confronts issues of pollution and 
industrial poisoning in its own shores, and as Japan’s chief ally and among its closest 
business partners, the experience of Minamata is not dissimilar from its own pollution 
cases such as Love Canal. 
This relationship between Japan and America is especially poignant given the fact 
America has its own population of atomic fallout victims, known as the “downwinders” 
or, as naturalist and downwinder Terry Tempest Williams explained, “people, individuals, 
communities that were downwind of the nuclear test site.”125 Williams also asserted that 
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the disproportionately large number of people within the downwinder community that 
have cancers and other radiation related diseases are “the result of nuclear fallout. … 
There are thousands of stories and narratives in the nuclear west that also bear this out.”126 
The downwinders could be termed the American hibakusha, who, while not intentionally 
irradiated by the use of atomic weapons directly upon them, were nonetheless affected 
by atomic weapons due to the lack of understanding of nuclear fallout and its collateral 
effects. While they were never stigmatized or excluded as the Japanese hibakusha were, 
the downwinders were forced to struggle for recognition from their own democratic 
government. Williams wrote of the first success in the recognition of the downwinder 
claims for compensation from a federal court, which took place in 1984, thirty years after 
many of the plaintiffs were initially irradiated: “It was the first time a federal court had 
determined that nuclear tests had been the cause of cancers.” It was an incomplete victory 
in that only ten of the twenty-four test cases were ruled to have provided sufficient “proof 
of causation.”127 Three years later the settlement was overturned: “To our court system, it 
does not matter whether the United States government was irresponsible, whether it lied 
to its citizens, or even that citizens died from the fallout of nuclear testing. What matters 
is that our government is immune: ‘The King can do no wrong.’”128
Beyond the reticence to acknowledge and compensate its own domestic 
hibakusha, America has also harbored a degree of self-censorship regarding the attitude 
and reasons for having carried out the atomic bombings on Japan, as the debacle of 
the 1994 proposed Smithsonian exhibit of the “Enola Gay” B-29 bomber that dropped 
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perceived “revisionism” in the exhibit script’s “failure” to sufficiently portray the 
Japanese as “aggressors” in the Pacific War, there was a distinct odor of censorship 
in regards to the presentation of the victims of the atomic bombs which America had 
dropped, resulting in the removal of more and more pictures of the victims, destruction, 
and suffering caused by the atomic bombings to make things more “balanced” instead of 
“skewed in Japan’s favor.”129
The struggle of the hibakusha for recognition goes beyond simply seeking 
reintegration into the mainstream, however, and the same is equally true for the victims of 
Minamata disease. Indeed, it is doubtful reintegration would “solve” the issues faced by 
the “poisoned people,” or fully redress the harm done to them by the radiation or mercury 
debilitating their bodies, their exclusion by society, and their continuing personal health 
problems. Historical revisionism and selective remembrance are set squarely against their 
experience. 
In relation to the atomic bombs, yuiitsu no hibakukoku continues to be a major 
Japanese claim to credibility on the world stage on important global issues, and it has 
even recently been used as an argument for Japanese nuclear armament in order to 
prevent becoming a nuclear target again.130 America has its own version of the yuiitsu 
no hibakukoku idea, only from a reversed perspective, as the “only nuclear power to 
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have used a nuclear weapon.”131 In continuing to speak out, even from a state of near 
“voicelessness,” hibakusha preserve not only their experience, but speak profoundly 
to the arguments against nuclear weapons and their use within a world of nuclear 
proliferation. Hibakusha expressions of their excluded experience not only assert that 
adequate compensation and social equality have yet to be achieved, but further that there 
is a larger matter at stake that concerns all people in all nations: the threat of annihilation 
by nuclear weapons. It may well be that the main goal of many hibakusha has, over time, 
become recognition, for which integration and overcoming their enduring stigmatization 
is only a benchmark. Recognition of hibakusha would mean by extension that the 
looming threat of nuclear weapons would actually be engaged by the public at large, 
not just in Japan, but also in America and in other countries with nuclear armaments. 
To internalize the atomic bombings would prompt a reexamination of the factors that 
led to the bombings, a situation that may require an admission of guilt on the part of the 
Japanese government for not having ended the war sooner, or for having provoked it in 
the first place via “imperial” expansion in Asia. To achieve this recognition would mean 
that the stewardship of the anti-nuclear experience of the hibakusha would become a 
communally held value, not just a peripheral discussion point in the myriad of issues 
regarding “national security.” 
Minamata victims have continually sought to bring suits for further compensation 
against Chisso. After a substantial bit of progress in 1973 court ruling that found Chisso 
guilty of negligence, the truer victory did not ring out until 1979 that the Japanese 
Supreme court found “top Chisso executives guilty of negligent homicide.”132 Otherwise, 
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many suits often receive court verdicts that simultaneously acknowledge scant numbers 
of new cases for compensation and grant ever lower sums for that aid, all the while often 
revising the definition of who is able to file for such money in future cases. To fully 
acknowledge Minamata would take a full, sincere admission of fault on the part of the 
Japanese model that propelled the country, in phoenix-like form, into the prosperity of 
the 1970’s and 1980’s—the focus on economy and big business—to even begin to fully 
rectify the situation of Minamata victims, presenting a direct challenge to the direction 
and progress of the rapid growth period following year zero. There would have to be 
a societal reckoning of the cost in human life, and perhaps an evaluation regarding the 
government’s ability to have prevented or responded to the tragedy more quickly. 
Eric Johnston points out an interesting intersection of both groups of poisoned 
people, resulting from the struggles of fighting for Minamata recognition and 
compensation.
 If there has been any good news to the tragedy of Minamata, it is that 
the struggles of the victims gave rise to an aggressive, nationwide citizens’ 
environmental movement in the 1960’s and early 1970’s that led to some much 
needed environmental laws -- indeed, to the creation of the Environmental 
Agency itself. And the momentum from that time continues. Many of today’s 
activists trying to halt the country’s nuclear power industry or warning about the 
dangers of asbestos are veterans of, or have a great interest in, the battles fought 
by the Minamata victims.133
Beginning in September 2009, a new political party came to power in the 
Japanese government—the DPJ, or Democratic Party Japan—which broke the virtually 
fifty-five year-long rule of the conservative LDP. With this change, the situation of the 
excluded in Japan has under gone a new evaluation. The case for compensation on 
behalf of those poisoned by mercury in Minamata was been given a new, more inclusive 
settlement. Over two thousand previously unrecognized victims of industrial poisoning 
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were granted compensation by the government, nearly matching in a single action the 
total number of those compensated after both the 1959 and 1965 cases. A change in the 
required mercury parts per million count to qualify as affected by mercury poisoning 
also opened the door for potentially over thirty thousand previously unrecognized people 
affected by “Minamata disease symptoms” to apply for compensation.134 One of the most 
heavily excluded groups within the hibakusha, the Korean hibakusha, were not only the 
least compensated group of hibakusha but were also severed from compensation entirely 
by living outside the country after the 1965 normalization of relations with Korea,135 but 
have now received some attention from the DPJ administration in March 2010 with the 
lifting of the requirement that they visit Japan in person to apply for hibakusha medical 
aid.136  
If the experiences of the excluded demonstrate one thing, it is that Japan’s 
democracy, from the government itself to the citizenry of the general public, has 
retained blind spots that were formed in the past. Japan’s democracy is not so much 
incomplete in its processes as it is selectively oblivious to the needs of certain segments 
of its population. This feature is not, of course, unique to Japan, as an examination of 
American’s own democracy reveals, especially during the same time period of 1945 to 
1975. The anti-Vietnam War demonstrations are not unlike the Japanese Anpo protests, 
and the myriad of activity within the growing Civil Rights movements attest to a very 
similar legacy of exclusion felt by some American citizens. 
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American, too, has a role to play in the recognition of the excluded, poisoned 
peoples of Japan. American President Barack Obama wrote about being “strongly 
affected” by the pictures of Minamata disease victims he had seen in Life magazine 
in 1972.137 He has since worked in the Senate, and as President, for a worldwide ban 
on industrial mercury usage. Involvement of the United States and its President in the 
Minamata issue would raise awareness of the tragedy to a level where Japan could no 
longer afford to ignore the breadth of the damage. 
America could also influence the situation of the hibakusha for the better by 
agreeing to the request of many hibakusha over the years, voiced in a 2009 letter from a 
hibakusha in Okinawa, Miki Tsukushita, for “free access to information on the effects of 
radiation on A-bomb survivors that the U.S. still holds and refuses to disclose.”138 This 
one simple act, far removed from admitting guilt for the atomic bombings, would combat 
the void of information that has led to continuing fear and ostracism regarding hibakusha. 
Tsukushita’s letter further stated: 
A repetition of a rhetorical and eloquent emphasis on human rights and 
human dignity alone will not bring about meaningful change to those whose lives  
have been irreparably altered. … At the same time, we Japanese also need to 
respect the human rights and human dignity … As Obama said, ‘the final area in 
which we must work together is in upholding the fundamental rights and dignity 
of all human beings.’ This applies to us all, regardless of nationality.139
 Harkening to and building upon Kenzaburō Ōe’s sentiment regarding the 
hibakusha—to acknowledge the “human dignity” of all the excluded—from hibakusha 
and Minamata victims to Ainu and foreigners living and working in Japan, and to attend 
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to “the equal administration of justice”140 on their behalf governmentally and in their 
immediate communities as well, may prove to be the key to reclaiming the experiences 
of the excluded—not just in Japan, but across the world. Without embracing these tragic 
experiences as part of the fabric of their nations, no democracies can be complete. 
Hibakusha and Minamata victims demonstrate that there is an ability within any society 
for the continual creation of new groups of the excluded, or groups of people who do 
not enjoy the full benefits of democratic society. The ultimate message the voices of the 
hibakusha and the Minamata victims may offer is that nations must evolve to embrace a 
true, borderless humanism. Indeed it seems that both Japan and the United States have a 
moral obligation to heed these voices and take leadership roles globally in championing 
the excluded, a role that admittedly will not be an easy one to adopt when other internal 
voices continue to call for national security and defense against real and perceived 
nuclear terrorism, and for economic progress to ensure prosperity, even when it is carried 
out at the expense of the environment and human life. 
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